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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS YOUNGFIELD,. 
Applicant, 
vs. 
SMITH & EDWARDS COMPANY, 
and/or WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
FUND OF UTAH, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Industrial Commission 
Case No. 87000510 
Administrative Law Judge: 
Gilbert A. Martinez 
Court of Appeals No.: 
880114-CA 
Calendar Priority #6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. The threshold issue of whether the incident for 
which Douglas Youngfield claims benefits 
constituted an accident is not one which appellants 
have raised on appeal. 
Point II. Mr. Youngfield did not sustain his burden regarding 
the issue of legal causation in the proceedings 
below. He did not present any evidence to show 
that his employment presented him with something 
which substantially increased the risk he faced in 
everyday life because of his preexisting condition. 
Point III. The finding that the legal causation test set forth 
in Allen v. Industrial Com'n. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986) , was met in this case cannot be sustained 
because it is not based on any facts which show 
t h a t the a c t i v i t i e s Mr. Youngfield engaged in 
amounted to unusual or extraordinary exert ion. The 
finding i s , instead, based on the mere conclusion 
a s s e r t e d by the Administrat ive Law Judge that 
n
 " l i f t i n g an o b j e c t w e i g h i n g 47 1/2 pounds 
represents an 'unusual and extraordinary exertion' 
n 
. . . 
Point IV. The award of benefits to Mr. Youngfield cannot be 
susta ined in t h i s case because the medical cause 
t e s t se t forth in Allen, supra* was not considered 
by the Administrative Law Judge or the Commission. 
M e d i c a l c a u s a t i o n i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e for a 
compensable injury and i f there i s no finding of 
medical causation, there i s no compensable in3ury. 
The finding need not be based on the opinion of a 
m e d i c a l panel a l o n e , but when t h e r e i s any 
uncerta inty or complexity as to the connect ion 
between the work-related event and the in}ury, a 
medica l panel should be u t i l i z e d t o a id the 
Commission and f a i l u r e to refer the i s s u e to a 
panel i s an abuse of d i scre t ion . 
ARGDMENT 
POINT I . WHETHER THE APPLICANT'S INJURY 
OCCURRED "BY ACCIDENT" IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS 
CASE. 
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I n t h e i r b r i e f , r e s p o n d e n t s d e v o t e s e v e r a l p a g e s t o a 
d i s c u s s i o n of the i s s u e whether t h e f i n d i n g t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t ' s 
i n j u r y occurred by a c c i d e n t i n t h i s c a s e i s proper* The need t o r 
t h e d i s c u s s i o n i s p r e m i s e d on a s t a t e m e n t i n a p p e l l a n t s ' b r i e f 
t h a t " i t i s a r g u a b l e whether t h e f i r s t p r e r e q u i s i t e , a c c i d e n t r was 
e s t a b l i s h e d • " ( B r i e f o f R e s p o n d e n t s , p p . 8 - 1 0 . ) T h a t 
s t a t e m e n t , however , was f o l l o w e d by: 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e i s s u e t h e C o m m i s s i o n 
a d d r e s s e d i n t h i s c a s e was n o t whether t h e 
i n j u r y occurred by a c c i d e n t , but whether t h e r e 
was a c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n between t h e i n j u r y and 
t h e employment. 
( B r i e f o f A p p e l l a n t s , p . 1 2 . ) A p p e l l a n t s have n o t r a i s e d t h e 
Commiss ion's f i n d i n g of an a c c i d e n t i n t h i s appea l and i t i s no t 
an i s s u e f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n h e r e . 
POINT I I . LEGAL CAUSATION REQUIRES A SHOWING 
THAT THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTED SOMETHING 
SUBSTANTIAL TO INCREASE THE RISK A PERSON WITH 
A PREEXISTING CONDITION ALREADY FACES IN 
EVERYDAY LIFE BECAUSE OF HIS CONDITION AND THE 
APPLICANT DID NOT MAKE SUCH A SHOWING IN THIS 
CASE. 
A c l a i m a n t w i t h a p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n b e a r s t h e burden of 
s h o w i n g h i s e m p l o y m e n t r e q u i r e d s o m e e x t r a e x e r t i o n w h i c h 
i n c r e a s e d t h e r i s k he a l r e a d y f a c e d i n everyday l i f e i n order t o 
e s t a b l i s h t h a t he s u f f e r e d a c o m p e n s a b l e i n j u r y . A l l e n v . 
I n d u s t r i a l Com'n, 729 P.2d 1 5 , 25 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) . The a p p l i c a n t i n 
t h i s c a s e o f f e r e d no e v i d e n c e of an a d d i t i o n a l e l ement or r i s k i n 
t h e w o r k p l a c e w h i c h would s u s t a i n h i s burden . The a c t i v i t y i n 
which he was engaged a t t h e t ime of h i s i n j u r y was l i f t i n g a box 
of shotgun s h e l l s . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e box weighed between 75 
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and 100 pounds. Evidence that he was required to l i f t o b j e c t s of 
e x c e s s i v e weight might show the necessary add i t iona l element or 
r i s k # but e v i d e n c e l a t e r submitted by appe l lan t s of the actual 
w e i g h t proved t h e box weighed 47 1 /2 pounds . The a p p l i c a n t 
of fered no other evidence to show that h i s e x e r t i o n exceeded that 
which the average person must make in nonemployment l i f e . There 
i s no th ing in t h e record t o show t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t ' s injury 
r e s u l t e d from a n y t h i n g but a s t r a i g h t l i f t of a 47 1/2 pound 
objec t that wasn't cumbersome or awkward, without a s l i p or t w i s t 
adding e x c e s s i v e s t r a i n . His work added nothing t o the personal 
r isk he brought with him to the workplace. L i f t i n g 47 1/2 pounds 
i s done frequent ly by people off the job emptying garbage c a n s , 
l i f t i n g small c h i l d r e n f l i f t i n g p e t s , changing t i r e s , e t c . 
POINT I I I . THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT THE 
LEGAL CAUSATION TEST OF ALLEN IS MET IN THIS 
CASE IS BASED ON A MERE CONCLUSION AND IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE 
DETERMINATION OF LEGAL CAUSATION TO BE MADE. 
Respondents c i t e Pr ice River Coal Co. v . I n d u s t r i a l Com'n, 
731 P . 2 d 1079 (Utah 1986 ) , t o show " t h e p r o p e r s t e p s for 
d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r l e g a l c a u s a t i o n e x i s t s . " ( B r i e f of 
Respondents/ pp. 13 f 14 . ) The Court in Price River s t a t e d , 
The q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e employment 
a c t i v i t i e s of a given employee are s u f f i c i e n t 
t o s a t i s f y t h e l e g a l standard of unusual or 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y e f f o r t i n v o l v e s two s t e p s . 
F i r s t , the agency must determine as a matter 
of f a c t e x a c t l y what were t h e employment-
r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s of t h e injured employee. 
Second , the agency must decide whether those 
a c t i v i t i e s a m o u n t e d t o u n u s u a l o r 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y e x e r t i o n . T h i s S e c o n d 
determination is a mixed question of law and 
fact . 
731 P.2d at 1082 (emphasis added.) The Court went on to s ta te 
t ha t the Commission's findings as to what the injured worker's 
j ob - r e l a t ed a c t i v i t i e s were inadequate to enable the Court to 
determine whether the workers ' a c t i v i t i e s "rose to the level 
necessary to s a t i s f y the 'unusual or ex t r ao rd ina ry ' exer t ion 
t h r e s h o l d e s t a b l i s h e d by Al len for injured employees with 
p reex i s t ing problems." 731 P.2d at 1083. The employee worked 
a lone and h i s employer and his widow presented conf l i c t i ng 
testimony regarding his ac t iv i t i e s in the workplace on the day he 
died. The findings of the Administrative Law Judge in the case 
did not resolve the conf l ic t s . He found that the employee died 
"as the result of an accident in the course of his employment . . 
• r e s u l t i n g from unusual exertion and s t ress connected with his 
employment." I£ . The Court s ta ted , 
I t may be argued tha t t h i s i s a sufficient 
f i n d i n g of l e g a l c a u s e to war ran t our 
a f f i rming the Commission on t h i s p o i n t . 
However the "finding" <?f ungual exertion anfl 
s t ress is nothing more than a conclusion. I t 
i s not supported by anything tha t could be 
construed as a finding as to precisely what 
[ the worker] was doing on the day of his 
d e a t h . We c a n n o t a f f i rm such a mixed 
cpnpiMgjQp of fact and law when its necessary 
premises are not evident. 
Id . (emphasis added.) As in Pr ice River, in t h i s case the 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge ' s finding tha t " l i f t i n g an object 
weighing 47 1/2 pounds represents an 'unusual and extraordinary 
exertion' to establish proof of legal causation" is nothing more 
than a conclusion. The Administrative Law Judge found that "a 
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Twentieth Century person performing non-employment life activities 
would not be generally expected to lift an object of 47 1/2 pounds 
during a normal day away from work," but this is merely a 
statement which is not supported by anything that could be 
construed as a finding that establishes the exertion required to 
lift 47 1/2 pounds as an unusual or extraordinary exertion. As 
stated previously/ the conclusion's premise is flawed. It is not 
at all unusual or extraordinary for individuals to lift 47 1/2 
pound objects on a regular daily basis. Garbage cans, small 
children, pets, brief cases, suitcases, etc. are commonly in 
excess of 47 1/2 pounds and are lifted daily by individuals in 
their nonemployment lives. 
As the Court stated in Price River, the determination of 
unusual or extraordinary exertion is "a mixed question of law and 
fact." It cannot be supported by a mere assertion that the facts 
in question satisfy the legal standard. Allen v. Industrial 
Com'n, supra, gave clear direction to the Commission for the 
determination of the question of fact. It set forth a list of 
typical activities and exertions expected of men and women in the 
later part of the 20th century. 729 P.2d at 26, 27. It is 
incumbent upon the Commission to at least compare the lifting of a 
47 1/2 pound box to the activities set forth in Allen to support a 
finding that the activity amounted to unusual or extraordinary 
exertion. As in Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Coin'rit supra, 
this Court cannot be called upon to affirm "such a mixed 
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conclusion of tact and law when its necessary premises are not 
evident." 731 P.2d at 1083. 
POINT IV. THE FINDING THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF 
LEGAL CAUSE IS SATISFIED CANNOT ALONE SUPPORT 
AN AWARD OF BENEFITS; THERE MUST ALSO BE A 
FINDING OF MEDICAL CAUSATION, WHICH REQUIRES 
MEDICAL PANEL INPUT IN CASES OF MEDICAL 
UNCERTAINTY OR COMPLEXITY. 
In Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Com'n, supra, the Court 
stated^ 
Since [the employee] brought heart disease to 
the workplace, before legal causation can be 
established, the Commission must find that his 
employment a c t i v i t i e s involved exer t ion or 
s t r e s s in excess of the normally expected 
leve l of nonemployment ac t iv i ty for men and 
women in the l a t t e r half of the twent ie th 
century. If such a finding is made, then the 
requi rement of l e g a l cause i s s a t i s f i e d 
because i t i s presumed tha t the employment 
increased the r isk of injury to which that 
w o r k e r was o t h e r w i s e s u b j e c t in h i s 
nonemployment l i f e . At t h a t p o i n t , the 
inquiry shif ts to medical cause, i . e . , whether 
the injured p a r t y ' s work-related ac t iv i t i e s 
were, in fact , causally linked to the injury. 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, at 26. 
731 P.2d at 1082 (emphasis added.) In th i s case, the inquiry 
never shifted to the question of medical cause. In their brief, 
respondents asser t : 
Upon review of cases in which the standards 
es tab l i shed in Allen are applied without a 
previous finding respecting medical causation, 
the Utah Supreme Court has concluded where 
appropr ia te tha t medical causation has been 
established from the record. 
In support of t h e i r a s s e r t i o n , respondents c i t e Utah Transit 
Authority v. Booth, 728 P.2d 1012 (Utah 1986), Miera v. Industrial 
Com'n, 728 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1986), and Richfield Care Center v. 
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Torgerson, 733 P.2d 178 (Utah 1987). In Utah Trans i t Authori ty v . 
Booth # h o w e v e r , t h e a p p l i c a n t was no t shown t o have any 
p r e e x i s t i n g back condition* 728 P.2d a t 1014. The evidence on 
the record was t ha t the app l i can t , while working, f e l t a popping 
in h is back, accompanied by sharp pa in , and had to be l i f t e d out 
of h i s bus d r i v e r s ' sea t and taken to the Sa l t Lake I n d u s t r i a l 
C l i n i c where a CAT Scan r evea l ed a bu lg ing d i s c (728 P.2d a t 
1013). Because there was no p reex i s t ing condi t ion , t h i s evidence 
c l e a r l y and d i r e c t l y s u p p o r t e d , w i t h o u t more, t h e C o u r t ' s 
conclusion t h a t n[m]edical causat ion was a l so es tab l i shed by the 
r e c o r d . " 728 P .2d a t 1 0 1 4 . In R i c h f i e l d Care Center v . 
T o r g e r s o n , t h e a p p l i c a n t s u f f e r e d from a p r e e x i s t i n g back 
condi t ion and the Administrat ive Law Judge submitted the matter to 
a medical panel for eva lua t ion . 733 P.2d a t 179. In Miera v. 
I n d u s t r i a l Com'n, where the appl icant had a p reex i s t i ng condi t ion , 
t h e ma t t e r a l s o was submitted to a medical pane l . 728 P.2d a t 
1024. The Court s t a t e d , 
The m e d i c a l c a u s a t i o n t e s t i s l i k e w i s e 
s a t i s f i e d by the medical p a n e l ' s f inding t h a t 
" t h e work a c t i v i t i e s as d e s c r i b e d over a 
three-day period could produce a lumbar spra in 
a g g r a v a t i n g the p r e e x i s t i n g problem he had -
had." 
Medical causat ion in a case in which the appl icant suf fers a 
p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n i s a quest ion of whether the a p p l i c a n t ' s 
work-related exer t ion led to the r e su l t i ng in ju ry . Al len , supra , 
a t 27. The question i s not answered by any finding regarding the 
s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e x e r t i o n t o meet t h e l e g a l c a u s a t i o n 
requi rement . Nor i s i t answered by r e l i ance on the a p p l i c a n t ' s 
8 
testimony that the exertion caused his injuryf especially in a 
case such as this. The incident for which the applicant claims 
benefits occurred on February 5, 1987. The applicant continued to 
work and did not seek medical treatment for the injury he claims 
resulted from the incident until February 12, 1987. 
Respondents refer to flgne yt JfF, Shea CQt, 728 P.3d 1008 
(Utah 1986), for the proposition that referral to a medical panel 
is permissive/ not mandatory. In Hone. however, the Court 
remanded on the basis that it was unable to dispose of the medical 
causation question because the Administrative Law Judge did not 
allow the applicant to present medical evidence pertinent to the 
issue of medical causation. 728 P.2d at 1012. The Court itself 
found legal causation, under the Allen standard, on the evidence 
in the record. The applicant had suffered no preexisting injuries 
and therefore needed to show only that his injury occurred during 
a usual or ordinary exertion on the job. The Court stated, 
The evidence is undisputed that the claimant 
was injured as he began to put on "heavy and 
unwieldy coveralls" at work. Those coveralls 
were required for the outdoor construction 
work in which the claimant was engaged. Proof 
of legal causation is further substantiated by 
the fact that immediately after the incident 
the claimant saw the nurse at the work site 
first aid station, where the back pain was 
first diagnosed. 
728 P.2d at 1011, 1012. Nevertheless, the Court remanded "for a 
determination of medical causation and a subsequent ruling 
consistent with this opinion." 728 P.2d at 1012. The Court also 
stated, 
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Although referral to the medical panel is not 
required by statute, we believe in this case 
that the findings of that panel would aid the 
administrative law judge. See Champion Home 
Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 
306, 308 (Utah 1985) (evidence of causal 
connection between work-related event and the 
injury may be uncertain or highly technical 
whereby failure to refer the case may be an »... 
abuse of discretion). 
Id . If the findings of a medical panel would aid the 
Administrative Law Judge in a case in which no question of 
preexisting condition is present and no gap between the incident 
and treatment for injury occurred/ certainly the findings of a 
medical panel should be utilized to assist the Commission in this 
case. The language of Champion Home Builders v. Industrial 
Commission, supra, establishes that where evidence of causal 
connection between the event and the injury may be uncertain or 
highly technical, failure to refer the matter to a medical panel 
is an abuse of discretion. Where, as here, neither the 
Administrative Law Judge nor the Commission addressed the question 
of medical causation, the evidence of causal connection between 
the event and the injury must be said to be uncertain. 
CONCLUSION 
When an employee with a preexisting condition seeks benefits 
for an injury associated with an incident at work, the Commission 
must apply the law as set forth in Allen, supra, to determine 
whether the injury is compensable. There must be a finding of 
accident, and a finding of a legal causal connection and a 
medical causal connection between the injury and the employment. 
10 
The legal causal connection must be supported by an objective 
finding supported by facts showing the employee's action while at 
work exceeded the exertion the average person typically undertakes 
in nonemployment life. The medical causal connection cannot 
simply be imputed. The stringencies of the law exist for a 
purpose. The workers' compensation laws of Utah serve a 
beneficent function, but they are not meant to compensate workers 
for injuries resulting from the personal risks they carry with 
them into the workplace. 
Appellants respectfully request the Court to reverse the 
Commission's decision awarding benefits to Douglas Youngfieldf or, 
in the alternative/ to remand to the Commission with direction 
that the issues presented on appeal be determined in accordance 
with the proper application of the workers' compensation statutes 
as described in Allen, supra, and the other decisions of this 
Court controlling these issues. 
/^ 
DATED this '~j day of September, 1988. 
/ $ / 
James R. Black 
bl 
Wendy Moseley 
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Cite as 729 P^d 
Robert A. ALLEN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Board of 
Review, Jer Ken, Inc., State Insurance 
Fund and Second Injury Fund, Defend-
ants. 
No. 20026. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 14, 1986. 
Worker, who sustained lower back in-
juries while stacking milk crates containing 
four to six gallons of milk, sought review 
of an order of the Industrial Commission, 
denying his motion for review of an order 
of an administrative law judge denying his 
workers' compensation claim. The Su-
preme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) 
finding that worker's injury was not "by 
accident" was not based on the evidence 
and, thus, was erroneous, but (2) worker's 
claim would be remanded for further fact 
finding as to whether action of worker, 
who had previous back problems, in lifting 
several piles of milk crates exceeded exer-
tion which average person typically under-
took in nonemployment life and whether 
medically demonstrable causal link existed 
between worker's lifting and injury to his 
back. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Hall, C.J., filed opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, with Stewart, 
Associate C.J., joining in the dissent. 
Stewart, Associate C.J., dissented and 
filed opinion. 
1. Evidence <s=»18 
Supreme Court took judicial notice that 
liquid milk weighs about the same as liquid 
water or approximately eight and one-third 
pounds per gallon; thus, four gallons of 
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the 
containers and crate, and six gallons of 
milk weigh about 50 pounds without con-
tainers and crate. 
STRIAL COM'N Utah 15 
15 (Utah 1986) 
2. Workers' Compensation <s=»515 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, key requirement of an "accident" is 
that occurrence be unanticipated, un-
planned, and unintended; where either 
cause of injury or result of exertion is 
different from what would normally be ex-
pected to occur, occurrence is unplanned, 
unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by 
"accident"; clarifying Carling v. Industri-
al Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 
202. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Workers' Compensation <3=>515 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, proof of unusual event may be helpful 
in determining causal connection between 
injury and employment; however, proof of 
unusual event is not required as an element 
of requirement that injury be "by acci-
dent." U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>515 
An "accident," for purposes of require-
ment that injury be "by accident" to be 
compensable under Workers' Compensation 
Act, is an unexpected or unintended occur-
rence that may be either the cause or the 
result of an injury; abandoning Redman 
Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm% 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 R2d 283; 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 
P.2d 328 (Utah); Farmer's Grain Cooper-
ative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah); 
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 
(Utah); Billings Computer Corp. v. Tar-
ango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah). U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-45. 
5. Workers' Compensation <s=»568 
Key question in workers' compensation 
case in determining causation is whether, 
given worker's body and worker's exertion, 
the exertion in fact contributed to the inju-
ry. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
6. Workers' Compensation <s»552, 568 
Only those injuries which occur be-
cause some condition or exertion required 
by employment increases risk of injury 
14 
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which worker normally faces in his every-
day life is compensable under Workers' 
Compensation Act; injuries which coinci-
dentally occur at work because preexisting 
condition results in symptoms which appear 
during work hours without any enhance-
ment from the work place are not compen-
sable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
7c Workers' Compensation <s=>597 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, two-part causation test, requiring con-
sideration of legal cause and medical cause 
of injury, is required in determining wheth-
er causal connection exists between injury 
and worker's employment; abandoning 
Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 
P.2d 104 (Utah); Sabo's Eke. Serv, v. 
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah); Church of Je-
sus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Indus-
trial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah); 
IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828 
(Utah); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construc-
tion and Mining Corp.f 565 P.2d 1144 
(Utah); Jones v. California Packing 
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640; Robert-
son v. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah 
25, 163 P.2d 331; Thomas D. Dee Memori-
al Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233; Kaiser 
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(Utah); Schmidt u Industrial Commis-
sion, 617 P02d 693 (Utah); Residential and 
Commercial Construction Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah); 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740; Baker v. Indus-
trial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 
P.2d 613; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
8. Workers' Compensation <©=>553 
Where claimant suffers from preexist-
ing condition which contributes to injury, 
unusual or extraordinary exertion is re-
quired to prove "legal causation," for pur-
poses of two-part causation test for deter-
mining • whether causal connection exists 
between claimant's injury and claimant's 
employment; where there is no preexisting 
condition, a usual or an ordinary exertion is 
sufficient to prove legal causation. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-45. 
9. Workers' Compensation <s=»597 
For purposes of legal causation ele-
ment of two-part test for determining 
whether causal connection exists between 
claimant's injury and claimant's employ-
ment, precipitating exertion must be com-
pared with usual wear and tear and exer-
tions of nonemployment life of people in 
general, not nonemployment life of the par-
ticular claimant in question. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-45. 
10. Workers' Compensation <&»597 
Under medical causation portion of 
two-part test for determining whether 
causal connection exists between claimant's 
injury and claimant's employment, claimant 
must show by evidence, opinion, or other-
wise that stress, strain, or exertion re-
quired by his or her occupation led to re-
sulting injury or disability. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-45. 
lie Workers' Compensation <S=»1390 
Evidence of ordinariness or usualness 
of employee's exertions may be relevant to 
medical conclusion of causal connection be-
tween claimant's injury and claimant's em-
ployment U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
12. Workers9 Compensation <©=»1533 
Finding that claimant's lower back in-
jury was not "by accident" as claimant was 
stacking milk crates was not based on the 
evidence and, thus, was erroneous; claim-
ant experienced unexpected and unantic-
ipated injury to his back as he lifted crate 
of milk in cramped area of cooler, claimant 
had not complained of pain or limitations at 
his job, and no evidence indicated that inju-
ry was predictable or developed gradually 
as with occupational disease or progressive 
back disorder. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
13, Workers' Compensation ^1950 
Compensation claim of worker, who 
had preexisting back problems and sus-
tained lower back injuries while stacking 
crates containing four to six gallons of 
milk, was remanded for further fact find-
ing on issue as to whether moving and 
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lifting several piles of crates weighing 30 
to 50 pounds in confined area of cooler 
exceeded exertion average person typically 
undertook in nonemployment life and 
'whether there was medically demonstrable 
causal link between worker's action in lift-
ing milk crates and injury to his back and, 
thus, ultimately, whether his injury "arose 
out of or in the course of employment." 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
Michael E. Bulson, Ogden, for plaintiff. 
Gilbert Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Sec-
ond Injury. 
Fred R. Silvester, James R. Black, Salt 
Lake City, for State Ins. Fund. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Claimant Robert A. Allen seeks a review 
from the Industrial Commission's denial of 
his motion for review of an administrative 
law judge order denying him compensation 
for a back injury sustained at work. For 
the reasons stated below, we reverse and 
remand. 
[1] On November 23, 1982, the claim-
ant, aged 36, was employed as night man-
ager of Kent's Foods. The claimant testi-
fied to the following version of events at a 
hearing before an administrative law 
judge. The claimant was working in a 
confined cooler in the store stacking crates, 
containing four to six gallons* of milk, 
from the floor onto a cooler shelf. While 
lifting one crate to about chest level, he 
suddenly felt a sharp pain in his lower 
back. He immediately set down the crate 
and asked another employee to continue 
stocking the shelves. The claimant com-
pleted the one-half hour remaining in his 
shift doing desk work. That night the pain 
increased, and by morning his left leg felt 
numb. Four or five days later, he saw Dr. 
Ivan Wright about his back problem. Ini-
tial doctor visits during December were 
followed through with the prescribed treat-
1. We take judicial notice that liquid milk weighs 
about the same as liquid water or approximately 
8'/3 pounds per gallon. Thus, four gallons of 
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the con-
JTRIAL COM'N Utah 17 
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ment of bed rest and medication. A myelo-
gram finally revealed a herniated disc, and 
the claimant spent ten days in traction in 
the hospital in early January. He did not 
return to work. 
The claimant also testified he had a histo-
ry of prior back injuries, including a fall 
from a telephone pole at age fourteen 
which required him to wear a back brace 
for several months, a back injury in 1977 
while lifting sand bags for the Logan 
School District, and another fall while 
working for that employer when he slipped 
on a slick concrete ramp and broke his 
coccyx. None of the prior injuries resulted 
in prolonged absences from work. 
The testimony from other sources varied 
slightly from the report given by the claim-
ant. The employer's report of injury de-
scribes the accident as "picking up freight 
and stocking it on shelves, lifting boxes 
and stacking them from truck." No specif-
ic event was mentioned in the employer's 
report. The medical records of treating 
physicians described the claimant's previ-
ous injuries, but omitted any reference to a 
specific incident in the cooler. Dr. Hannan, 
who examined the claimant on December 
31, 1982, wrote, "He does not remember 
any distinct episode as having precipitated 
his current problem, however." And in a 
letter from Dr. Bryner to Dr. Wright dated 
January 13, 1983, the claimant's history 
was related as follows: "About six weeks 
ago, however, he was lifting material at 
work, and recalls no specific injury or 
stress but developed discomfort in his left 
groin area which ultimately extended into 
his big toe." 
The administrative law judge found that 
the claimant's injury to his back on Novem-
ber 23, 1982, was not "an injury by acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of 
employment." It is apparent that the ad-
ministrative law judge, using a specific epi-
sode analysis, concluded there was no "ac-
cident" because there was no identifiable 
tainers and crate. Six gallons of milk weigh 
approximately 50 pounds without the containers 
and crate. 
16 
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event that caused the injury and because 
lifting the crates of milk was a routine and 
commonplace exertion expected of the job. 
The administrative law judge analogized 
the facts of this case to Farmer's Grain 
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1980), where a gradually developed back 
injury was held to be not compensable 
where the condition worsened without the 
intervention of any external occurrence or 
trauma. 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the 
claimant, who had suffered preexisting 
back problems and was injured as the re-
sult of an exertion usual and typical for his 
job, was injured "by accident arising out of 
or in the course of employment'' as re-
quired by the Workers' Compensation Act, 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986). That 
Act, in pertinent part, provides: 
Every employee . . . who is injured . . . 
by accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment . . . shall be 
paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury 
Id. This statute creates two prerequisites 
for a finding of a compensable injury. 
First, the injury must be "by accident/' 
Second, the language "arising out of or in 
the course of employment" requires that 
there be a causal connection between the 
injury and the employment. See Pitts-
burgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 
P.2d 1367, 1370 (Utah 1983). Prior deci-
sions by this Court have often failed to 
distinguish the analysis of the accident 
question from the discussion of causation 
elements.2 As a result, this Court and the 
Commission are faced with confusing and 
often inconsistent precedent. For this rea-
2. We note that many of our prior opinions so 
intermingled the causation and accident analy-
ses that it is impossible to segregate them and 
determine the basis for the Court's decision. 
For example, the opinion in Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. 
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982), mixes the acci-
dent and causation elements in the following 
language: "It appears to be mere coincidence 
that defendant's injury . . . occurred at work. 
Defendant bears the burden of showing other-
wise. Proof of the causal relationship of duties 
of employment to unexpected injury is simply 
lacking.... [T]he Commission's conclusion 
that an accident occurred is without any sub-
17 
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son we now undertake a fresh look at the 
policy and historical background of the 
workers' compensation statute in an at-
tempt to provide a clear and workable rule 
for future application by the Commission. 
I. 
The term "by accident" is not defined in 
the workers' compensation statutes. The 
most frequently referenced authority for 
the definition of "by accident" is the case 
of Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), where the 
term was defined as follows: 
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from 
what would normally be expected to oc-
cur in the usual course of events.... 
[Tjhis is not necessarily restricted to 
some single incident which happened sud-
denly at one particular time and does not 
preclude the possibility that due to exer-
tion, stress or other repetitive cause, a 
climax might be reached in such manner 
as to properly fall within the definition of 
an accident as just stated above. How-
ever, such an occurrence must be distin-
guished from gradually developing condi-
tions which are classified as occupational 
diseases.... 
Id. at 261-62, 399 P.2d at 203 (citing Jones 
v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 
612, 616, 244 P.2d 640, 642 (1952), and 
Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949)). 
Some confusion has developed as to wheth-
er "by accident" requires proof of an un-
usual event. This issue frequently arises 
when the employee suffers an internal fail-
ure3 brought about by exertions in the 
stantive support in the record." Id. at 726 (foot-
notes omitted). See also Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 590 
P.2d 328, 329-30 (Utah 1979); Pintar v. Industri-
al Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 414 (1963). 
For an example of an opinion which does sepa-
rate the accident and causation analysis, see 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328, 330-31 (Utah 
1979) (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
3. An "internal failure" refers to a category of 
injuries that arise from general organ or struc-
tural failure brought about by an exertion in the 
sh look at the 
round of the 
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workplace. It is clear, however, that our 
cases have defined "by accident" to include 
internal failures resulting from both usual 
and unusual exertions. See Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 
(Utah 1980). 
This Court first discussed the term "by 
accident" in Tintic Milling Co. v. Industri-
al Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278 
(1922), where an accident was said to be 
"something out of the ordinary, unex-
pected, and definitely located as to time 
and place." 60 Utah at 22, 206 P. at 281. 
This definition was used to distinguish inju-
ries which occurred gradually and were 
covered under statutory provisions for oc-
cupational disease. Id. The Court in Tin-
tic Milling also acknowledged that where 
the claimant suffers an internal failure the 
"unexpected result" rule of the seminal 
English case of Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] 
A.C. 443, 72 L.J.K. 789, 5 W.C.C. 1, is 
appropriate. The Court in Tintic Milling 
observed: 
"Since the case of Fenton v. Thorley, 
nothing more is required than that the 
harm that the plaintiff has sustained 
shall be unexpected It is enough 
that the causes, themselves known and 
usual, should produce a result which on 
a particular occasion is neither designed 
nor expected. The test as to whether an 
injury is unexpected, and so, if received 
on a single occasion, occurs 'by accident/ 
is that the sufferer did not intend or 
expect that injury would on that particu-
lar occasion result from what he was 
doing." 
60 Utah at 26, 206 P. at 282 (quoting Boh-
len, A Problem in The Drafting of Work-
men 's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv.L.Rev. 
328, 340 (1912) (emphasis added)). Accord-
ingly, the Court in Tintic affirmed a find-
ing that the employee, whose previous res-
piratory problems were aggravated by en-
tering a roasting flue, had suffered a com-
pensable accident. 
workplace. Internal failure claims evaluated by 
this Court include heart attacks, hernias, and 
back injuries. See generally, Note, Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission and Injury Compensabili-
18 
After Tintic Milling, the Court tempo-
rarily rejected the "unexpected result" def-
inition of Fenton v. Thorley in internal 
failure cases on the ground that the defini-
tion of "by accident" required an unusual 
occurrence or exertion. In Bamberger v. 
Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 240 
P. 1103 (1925), the Court denied compensa-
tion to a worker who unexpectedly suf-
fered a heart attack while manually unload-
ing a railroad car of coal on the ground 
that no overexertion occurred during the 
work. 66 Utah at 208, 240 P. at 1104. 
That decision was apparently overruled, 
however, when the Court embraced the 
"unexpected result" rule and awarded com-
pensation to an employee who suffered a 
heart attack after overexertions while rou-
tinely cleaning the weirs to a city reservoir. 
Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 84 
Utah 67, 87, 34 P.2d 687, 695 (1934) (Mof-
fat, J., concurring). Hammond was fol-
lowed in Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124 
(1937), where a unanimous Court held that 
the employee, who had suffered a ruptured 
aorta from riding a caterpillar tractor over 
rough ground, suffered an injury "by acci-
dent" since the result was "an unusual, 
unforeseen, and unexpected event or occur-
rence" and definite as to time and place. 
Id. at 92, 66 P.2d at 134. And, in Thomas 
D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. v. Indies-
trial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 
233 (1943), the Court sustained an award of 
benefits to a claimant who had suffered 
from heart disease and experienced a heart 
attack shortly after moving 52 boxes 
weighing 50 to 100 pounds and 28 sacks of 
fire clay—work that was unusually heavy 
and greatly in excess of his ordinary 
duties. The Court pointed out, in dicta, 
that the English common law would have 
awarded compensation even if the exer-
tions were ordinary and usually required as 
part of the job. 104 Utah at 67-71, 138 
P.2d at 23&-39. Quoting from the Bohlen 
article, supra, the Court observed: 
ty under Utah Worker's Compensation Law: A 
Just Result or Just Another "Living Corpse"?, 
1981 Utah L.Rev. 393. 
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"[N]othing more is required than that 
the harm that the plaintiff has sustained 
shall be unexpected The element of 
unexpectedness inherent in the word 'ac-
cident* is sufficiently supplied . . . if, 
though the act is usual and the condi-
tions normal, it causes a harm unfore-
seen by him who suffers i t" 
104 Utah at 70, 138 P.2d at 237. 
Six years later in Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 
P.2d 961 (1949), this Court explicitly 
adopted the English rule for the definition 
of an accident and awarded benefits to a 
claimant who unexpectedly injured his back 
while stepping on the brake pedal of a 
delivery truck—a usual and ordinary activi-
ty See 115 Utah 14-20, 201 P.2d 967-70. 
After summarizing early Utah cases inter-
preting "by accident" the Court concluded 
that "since 1922 this court has uniformly 
held that an unexpected internal failure 
meets the requirements of ["by accident"] 
4c The holding of Purity Biscuit was questioned 
in Mellen v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 373, 
431 P.2d 798 (1967), where the opinion errone-
ously stated that Purity Biscuit "has never been 
cited by this or any other court to support the 
law of that case." 19 Utah 2d at 375, 431 P.2d at 
799. In fact, by 1967 Purity Biscuit had been 
relied upon in decisions from the courts of nine 
other states. Alabama Textiles Prods, Corp. v. 
Grantham, 263 Ala, 179, 183-84, 82 So.2d 204, 
208 (1955) (finding of unusual strain or exertion 
unnecessary to support conclusion that claimant 
suffered injury by accident); Bryant Stave <fr 
Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 151-52, 296 
S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1956) {Purity Biscuit cited 
as stating majority position that usual exertion 
causing an internal failure may be by accident); 
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 
231 Cal.App.2d 111, 41 Cal.Rptr. 628, 635 (1964) 
(relying upon causation rule of Purity Biscuit); 
Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 138 So.2d 308, 314 
(Fla.1962) (back herniation from rupture of in-
tervertebral disc satisfies statutory requirement 
of suddenness); Roman v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 
268 Minn. 367, 380, 129 N.W.2d 550, 559 (1964) 
(calls Purity Biscuit "a well-considered work-
men's compensation case" that supported an 
award where many factors led to the disability); 
Murphy v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 208, 
321 P.2d 1094, 1100 (1958) (quoting favorably 
the reliance on Purity Biscuit in Bryant Stave, 
227 Ark. at 151-52, 296 S.W.2d at 439-40, and 
holding that a usual exertion may lead to a 
compensable injury where the causal relation-
ship is established); Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 
10 N.J. 325, 327-28, 91 A.2d 569, 570 (1952) (Pu> 
and the legislature by failing to amend has 
acquiesced in that construction." 115 Utah 
at 15, 201 P.2d at 968. 
The holding of Purity Biscuit also 
squarely embraced the concept that an or-
dinary or usual exertion that results in an 
unexpected injury is compensable. See 115 
Utah at 18-19, 201 P. at 969-70. After 
carefully considering the legislative pur-
pose of the workers' compensation statute, 
prior precedent, and public policy, the 
Court rejected the requirement that proof 
of an unusual activity or exertion be a 
required element of the "by accident" defi-
nition. 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at 
967-70. The Court concluded that "there 
is nothing in the statute which would justi-
fy a holding that an injury is compensable 
where overexertion is shown but is not 
compensable where only ordinary exertion 
is shown, provided that in both cases it is 
shown that the exertion causes the inju-
ry." 4 115 Utah at 19, 201 P.2d at 970. 
rity Biscuit cited in support of rule that internal 
failure from ordinary or usual exertion is an 
"injury by accident"); Olson v. State IndusL 
Accident Comm'n, 222 Or. 407, 416-17, 352 P.2d 
1096, 1101 (1960) (O'Connell, J., specially con-
curring) (dissent to Purity Biscuit quoted); Coo-
per v. Vinatieri, 73 S.D. 418, 424, 43 N.W.2d 747, 
750-51 (1950) (Purity Biscuit cited as an exam-
ple of the divergent viewpoints for defining a 
compensable accident). 
In addition, the decision in Purity Biscuit was 
relied upon by the majority in three Utah cases. 
See Jones v. California Packing Co., 121 Utah 
612, 244 P.2d 640, 642; Carling v. Industrial 
Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202; 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 
140, 427 P.2d 740. Despite this support for the 
decision in Purity Biscuit, the Court in Mellen 
concluded without further discussion that "[t]he 
Purity Biscuit decision certainly needs a healthy 
reappraisement" 19 Utah 2d at 376, 431 P.2d at 
800. Two years later in Redman Warehousing 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 
P.2d 283 (1969), the Court again questioned the 
Purity Biscuit decision in a superficial analysis 
that concluded: "Purity enjoys the unique and 
doubtful distinction of being a living corpse." 
22 Utah 2d at 403, 454 P.2d at 286. After 
considering those cases from Utah and other 
jurisdictions that have relied on Purity Biscuit, 
we now cannot agree that it was a "living 
corpse." Moreover, even if Purity Biscuit lay 
dormant, it was resurrected by Schmidt v. In-
dustrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 
1980). 
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Since Purity Biscuit, numerous cases 
have held that an internal injury may be 
compensable if it results from either a 
usual or unusual exertion in the course of 
employment. See, e.g., Champion Home 
Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 
P.2d 306 (Utah 1985) (perforated ulcer 
caused by lifting an unusually heavy 
beam); Pittsburg Testing Laboratories v. 
Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367 (unforeseen and 
unanticipated heart attack resulting from 
exertion while inspecting roof structure); 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 
888 (Utah 1981) (back injury resulting from 
shoveling coal compensable despite usual-
ness of activity and presence of preexisting 
conditions); Painter Motor v. Ostler, 617 
P.2d 975 (Utah 1980) (back injury resulting 
from moving heavy boxes and installing 
electrical equipment); Schmidt v. Industri-
al Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980) 
(back injury resulting from carrying steel 
plates compensable despite prior history of 
back disorders and ordinary activity); 
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613 
P.2d 508 (Utah 1980) (heart attack result-
ing from exertion while rushing to drown-
ing accident); IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 
584 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) (heart attack re-
sulting from heavy lifting); Nuzum v. Roo-
sendahl Construction & Mining Corp., 
565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) (truck driver 
suffered heart attack after repeatedly 
climbing long steps); Residential & Com-
mercial Construction Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) 
(back injury resulting from moving lum-
ber); Powers v. Industrial Commission, 
19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P,2d 740 (1967) (heart 
distress occurring over a period of several 
months compensable despite preexisting 
conditions); Baker v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) 
(back injury resulting from filing papers in 
lower drawer compensable). 
Despite the strong precedential support 
for applying the "unexpected result" rule 
of Purity Biscuit to internal failure cases, 
a separate line of opposing authority has 
developed which requires overexertion or 
an unusual event to prove an injury oc-
curred "by accident." Typically, these 
STRIAL COM'N Utah 21 
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cases denied compensation because the 
claimants' ordinary work duties precipitat-
ed the injury. Consequently, there were no 
events or exertions that were unusual or 
extraordinary to qualify as "by accident" 
See, e.g., Billings Computer Corp. v. Tar- > 
ango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) (compensa-
tion for knee injury denied where circum-
stances precipitating the injury were com-
monplace and usual); Sabo's Electronic 
Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982) 
(back injury from loading box of twelve 
radios into van not compensable); Farm-
er's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 
237 (Utah 1980) (back injury to claimant 
with preexisting condition resulting from 
delivery of 100-pound sacks not compensa-
ble since the activity was not unusual or 
unexpected); Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) (back injury 
suffered by janitor upon standing up not 
compensable without evidence that activi-
ties were unusual); Redman Warehousing 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 
2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) (back injury 
precipitated by sitting and driving a mov-
ing van not compensable without proof of 
an unusual event). These cases will not be 
collectively referred to as the Redman line 
of cases. 
[2] We are now convinced that the Red-
man line of cases has misconstrued the 
historical and logical definition of "by acci-
dent." The Redman line of cases relied on 
the following abridged version of the defi-
nition of an accident found in Carling v. 
Industrial Commission: "[Accident] con-
notes an unanticipated, unintended occur-
rence different from what would normal-
ly be expected to occur in the usual 
course of events.1' 16 Utah at 261, 399 
P.2d at 203 (emphasis added; footnotes 
omitted). In Redman, the highlighted 
phrase was interpreted to require an un-
usual event before there can be an acci-
dent. This interpretation misconstrues the 
Carling decision itself and is inconsistent 
with the English definition of "by accident" 
used by this Court since 1922. The key 
requirement of an accident under the Car-
20 
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ling decision, as well as prior decisions, 
was that the occurrence be unanticipated, 
unplanned and unintended. The highlight-
ed phrase emphasized that where either the 
cause of the injury or the result of an 
exertion was different from what would 
normally be expected to occur, the occur-
rence was unplanned, unforeseen, unin-
tended and therefore "by accident" 
Policy considerations also militate in fa-
vor of rejecting the notion that the phrase 
"by accident" requires an unusual event. 
There is nothing in the term "accident" 
that suggests that only that which is un-
usual is accidental. See Robertson v. In-
dustrial Commission, 109 Utah at 33, 40, 
163 P.2d at 335, 338 (Wade, J., concurring; 
Wolfe, J., dissenting). An accident does 
not occur simply because a worker is in-
jured during an unusual activity. This ar-
gument is illustrated by Professor Larson 
in his treatise on workmen's compensation 
with the following example: 
If an employee intentionally and know-
ingly undertakes to lift an unusual load, 
the cause (i.e., the lifting) is no more 
accidental than if he deliberately lifted a 
normal load. Or if a gardener deliberate-
ly continues to mow the lawn in the rain, 
a passerby observing him would not say 
that he was undergoing an accident 
merely because it is unusual to mow 
lawns in the rain. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.-
62, at 7-162 (1986) (footnotes omitted). 
Larson also criticizes the usual-unusual 
distinction as being unworkable in practice. 
Realistically, it is impossible to determine 
what are the usual and normal require-
ments of a job. People work in good 
weather and bad, lift heavy items as well 
as light ones, and work for long hours as 
well as short ones. None of these activi-
ties may be unusual or unexpected. Id. 
§ 38.63 at 7-164 to -168. 
The unworkability of the usual-unusual 
event requirement is further evidenced by 
comparing seemingly irreconcilable deci-
sions by this Court. Compare Kaiser 
Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (back inju-
ry to miner with previous back problems 
held to be a compensable accident despite 
being caused by shoveling coal in the usual 
course of employment); with Farmer's 
Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 
(no accident where worker with previous 
back problems sustained back injury while 
delivering 100-pound bags of whey); com-
pare Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 
Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (compensable 
accident for back injury resulting from fil-
ing paper in lower drawer) with Billings 
Computer Corp, v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 
(no accident where worker sustained knee 
injury resulting from bending to pick up 
small parts). 
[3,4] We believe that the Court's real 
concern in the Redman line of cases was 
the presence or absence of proof of causa-
tion to support an award of compensation 
See generally Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, 590 P.2d at 332 (Wil-
kins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed 
in the next section, the Court has developed 
two parallel lines of authority on the causa-
tion issue, one of which requires an un-
usual event in order to meet the statutory 
causation requirement. Although proof of 
an unusual event may be helpful in deter-
mining causation, it is not required as an 
element of "by accident" in section 35-1-
45. "[T]he basic and indispensable ingredi-
ent of 'accident* is unexpectedness." 
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 696 (Wilkins, J., con-
curring) (quoting IB Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation, at 7-5 (1980). We there-
fore reaffirm those cases which hold that 
an accident is an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or 
the result of an injury. We thus necessar-
ily abandon the analysis of "by accident" in 
the Redman line of cases which predicates 
the "accident" determination upon the oc-
currence of an unusual event. 
II. 
The second element of a compensable 
accident requires proof of a causal connec-
tion between the injury and the worker's 
employment duties. Pittsburg Testing 
Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370 
(Utah 1983). In workers' compensation 
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cases involving internal failures, the key 
issue is usually one of causation. Ordinari-
ly, causation is proved by the production 
and interpretation of medical evidence ei-
ther alone or together with other evidence. 
See Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367, 1370; 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 
P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980). Because of the 
difficulties of diagnosis of internal failures 
and because of the possibility that a preex-
isting condition may have contributed to 
the injury, special causation rules have 
been developed for internal failure cases. 
See Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-269; Pu-
rity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 115 Utah 1, 20-21, 201 P.2d 970-71 
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially). 
This Court initially responded to the 
problem of causation in internal failure 
cases by suggesting that the Commission 
use a clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard when an internal failure was caused 
by an exertion in the workplace.5 See 
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. 
v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 
74, 138 P.2d 233, 238 (1943). The clear and 
convincing evidence standard was rejected, 
however, in Lipman v. Industrial Com-
mission, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979), 
with the rationale that such a standard 
would make workers' compensation bene-
fits nearly impossible to recover where the 
deceased suffered from a preexisting condi-
tion. Accordingly, the standard to prove 
causal connection is preponderance of the 
evidence. Id. 
The second method that has been used to 
ensure causal connection in internal failure 
cases is to require proof that an unusual 
event or activity precipitated the injury. 
Presumably, this requirement was used to 
prevent compensating a person predisposed 
to internal failure where the preexisting 
condition contributed more to the injury 
than his usual work activity. The follow-
ing internal failure cases illustrate that evi-
dence of an unusual event or activity is 
necessary to prove causation. Billings 
5. In Nebraska, an enhanced standard of proof is 
still used where the employee suffers from a 
preexisting condition. See Mann v. City of 
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Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104, 
106-07 (Utah 1983); Sabo's Electronic Ser-
vice v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, 726 n. 12 (Utah 
1982); Church of Jesus Christ oj'Latter-
Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 
590 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1979); IGA Food 
Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 829 (Utah 
1978); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construc-
tion & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146 
(Utah 1977); Jones v. California Packing 
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952); 
Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 
Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D. 
Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industri-
al Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d at 
233; see Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697-99 
(Crockett, J., dissenting); Farmer's Grain 
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237, 238-
39 (Utah 1980); Mellen v. Industrial Com-
mission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 374, 431 P.2d 798, 
799 (1967); Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 30, 
201 P.2d at 975 (Latimer, J., dissenting). 
Defendants argue that any rule that 
awards compensation based on usual exer-
tion will open the floodgates for payment 
of benefits for all internal injuries that 
coincidentally occur at work. They claim 
that the unusual exertion requirement is 
necessary to prevent the employer from 
becoming a general insurer. They argue 
that without the unusual exertion rule, em-
ployment opportunities for persons with a 
history or indication of physical disability 
or handicap will be reduced. 
Despite precedent supporting the "un-
usual exertion" rule, the claimant urges us 
to follow a separate line of authority that 
awards compensation for injuries that oc-
cur during usual and ordinary workplace 
activity. These cases typically award com-
pensation where the claimant was engaged 
in a workplace activity and where there is 
adequate evidence of medical causation. 
See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 
631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) (award for com-
pensation affirmed for a coal miner's back 
injury despite absence of unusual incident); 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 
P.2d at 695 (compensation awarded for 
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 592, 319 N.W.2d 454, 458 
(1982). 
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back injuries arising from ordinary duties 
upon proof of medical causal connection 
between workplace exertions and the inju-
ry); Residential and Commercial Con-
struction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (carpenter's back 
injury from lifting, bending, and twisting in 
the ordinary course of work compensable); 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740, 742 (1967) 
(awarding compensation to fireman for ex-
ertions in the normal course of employ-
ment—the Court rejecting the unusual ex-
ertion test in favor of ordinary exertion); 
Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 
2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury 
from filing papers in lower drawer of cabi-
net compensable); Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 
P.2d 961 (1949). Although the usual exer-
tion rule was questioned in Mellen v, In-
dustrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 375-
76, 431 P.2d at 800, that decision failed to 
explicitly overrule the usual exertion line of 
cases. Moreover, Residential and Com-
mercial Construction Co., Schmidt, and 
Kaiser Steel have awarded compensation 
for usual workplace activity after the Mel-
len decision. Clearly, the usual exertion 
rule is not simply an aberration in Utah 
law. 
When read in chronological sequence, 
our opinions demonstrate an inconsistent 
and confused approach to determining 
when an accident arose out of or in the 
course of employment. Much of this con-
fusion can be traced to fundamental prob-
lems stemming from the use of the usual-
unusual distinction as a means of proving 
causation. Larson criticizes the unusual 
exertion requirement by itself as a "clumsy 
and ill-fitting device with which to ensure 
causal connection." Larson, supra, § 38.-
81, at 7-270. The problems in determining 
what activities were usual or unusual were 
6. Larson's observation is consistent with this 
Court's rationale for rejecting the unusual exer-
tion requirement in Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 
16, 201 P.2d at 968: 
[I]f [overexertion] is the test no one will ever 
know what this court will consider sufficient 
overexertion. Also under that test if the work 
recognized as long ago as 1949 when Jus-
tice Wolfe wrote that a "Pandora's box of 
difficulties . . . may be opened by the re-
finements between usual and unusual, ex-
ertion and overexertion, ordinary and ex-
traordinary exertion measured by the indi-
vidual involved or by the industrial func-
tion performed by him or both/' Purity 
Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially). The con-
tents of the Pandora's box feared by Jus-
tice Wolfe are now evident in the plethora 
of our cases struggling with a definition of 
a compensable accident based upon the 
usualness or ordinariness of an activity. 
Professor Larson has also criticized the 
usual-unusual distinction because the ordi-
nariness of the activity fails to consider 
that some occupations routinely require a 
usual exertion capable of causing injury. 
Likewise, other occupations, such as desk-
work, require so little physical effort that 
an "unusual exertion" may be insufficient 
to prove that the resulting accident arose 
out of the employmento Larson, supra, 
§ 38.81, at 7-270,6 
[5] Because we find the present use of 
the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful and 
our prior precedent inconsistent, we take 
this opportunity to examine an alternative 
causation analysis that may better meet 
the objectives of the workers* compensa-
tion lawSc We are mindful that the key 
question in determining causation is wheth-
er, given this body and this exertion, the 
exertion in fact contributed to the injury. 
Id. § 38.82, at 7-271; Purity Biscuit, 115 
Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J., 
concurring specially). 
[6] The language "arising out of or in 
the course of his employment" found in 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986), was 
apparently intended to ensure that compen-
sation is only awarded where there is a 
usually required by the job is so great that it 
would break the strongest man even he will 
not be able to recover. But if it is more than 
usual exertion which causes the injury the 
employee can recover no matter how light the 
work is which causes the injury. 
Id. 
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sufficient causal connection between the caused this [injury]."7 
Utah 25 
Larson, supra, 
disability and the working conditions. The 
causation requirement makes it necessary 
to distinguish those injuries which (a) coin-
cidentally occur at work because a preexist-
ing condition results in symptoms which 
appear during work hours without any en-
hancement from the workplace, and (b) 
those injuries which occur because some 
condition or exertion required by the em-
ployment increases the risk of injury which 
the worker normally faces in his everyday 
life. See Bryant u Masters Machine Co., 
444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me.1982). Only the 
latter type of injury is compensable under 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. There is no fixed 
formula by which the causation issue may 
be resolved, and the issue must be deter-
mined on the facts of each case. 
[7] Professor Larson has suggested a 
two-part causation test which is consistent 
with the purpose of our workers' compen-
sation laws and helpful in determining cau-
sation. We therefore adopt that test. Lar-
son suggests that compensable injuries can 
best be identified by first considering the 
legal cause of the injury and then its medi-
cal cause. Larson, supra, § 38.83(a), at 
7-273. "Under the legal test, the law must 
define what kind of exertion satisfies the 
test of 'arising out of the employment' . . . 
[then] the doctors must say whether the 
exertion (having been held legally suffi-
cient to support compensation) in fact 
7. Cases from other jurisdictions which have ac-
cepted the dual-causation standard suggested by 
Larson include: Market Foods Distribs., Inc. v. 
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) 
(claimant with preexisting spinal disease denied 
compensation where injury could have been 
triggered at any time during normal movement 
and exertion at work not greater than typical 
nonemployment exertion); Guidry v. Sline In-
dus. Painters, Inc., 418 So.2d 626 (La.1982) 
(claimant granted compensation where injury 
resulted from stress, exertion, and strain greater 
than that in everyday nonemployment life); 
Bryant v. Masters Mach. Co., 444 A.2d 329 (Me. 
1982) (claimant with preexisting condition 
awarded compensation for back injury resulting 
from fall from his stool at work because of 
increased risk of falling where employees 
moved around him at work); Barrett v. Herbert 
Eng'g, Inc., 371 A.2d 633 (Me.1977) (claimant 
with preexisting back condition denied compen-
§ 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277. 
[8] 1. Legal Cause—Whether an inju-
ry arose out of or in the course of employ-
ment is difficult to determine where the 
employee brings to the workplace a person-
al element of risk such as a preexisting 
condition. Just because a person suffers a 
preexisting condition, he or she is not dis-
qualified from obtaining compensation. 
Our cases make clear that "the aggrava-
tion or lighting up of a pre-existing disease 
by an industrial accident is compensa-
ble " Powers v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 
743 (1967) (footnote omitted). To meet the 
legal causation requirement, a claimant 
with a preexisting condition must show 
that the employment contributed some-
thing substantial to increase the risk he 
already faced in everyday life because of 
his condition. This additional element of 
risk in the workplace is usually supplied by 
an exertion greater than that undertaken in 
normal, everyday life. This extra exertion 
serves to offset the preexisting condition of 
the employee as a likely cause of the inju-
ry, thereby eliminating claims for impair-
ments resulting from a personal risk rather 
than exertions at work. Larson, supra, 
§ 38.83(b), at 7-278. Larson summarized 
how the legal cause rule would work in 
practice as follows: 
sation for injury resulting from working at nor-
mal gait since there was no work-related en-
hancement of personal risk); Mann v. City of 
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 319 N.W.2d 454 (1982) 
(policeman with history of heart disease award-
ed compensation for heart attack at home 
where claimant's physician testified that attack 
was caused by stress of police work rather than 
personal risk factors); Sellens v. Allen Prods. 
Co., 206 Neb. 506, 293 N.W.2d 415 (1980) 
(claimant with preexisting heart problems de-
nied compensation for heart attack suffered 
while unloading 28-pound cases from truck 
trailer despite sedentary nonworking lifestyle 
using objective standard of average worker in 
nonemployment life); Couture v. Mammoth 
Groceries, Inc., 116 N.H. 181, 355 A.2d 421 
(1976) (claimant with no preexisting heart prob-
lems awarded benefits upon proof that lifting 
beef medically caused the fatal heart attack). 
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If there is some personal causal contri-
bution in the form of a [preexisting con-
dition], the employment contribution 
must take the form of an exertion great-
er than that of nonemployment life.... 
If there is no personal causal contribu-
tion, that is, if there is no prior weakness 
or disease, any exertion connected with 
the employment and causally connected 
with the [injury] as a matter of medical 
fact is adequate to satisfy the legal test 
of causation. 
Id. Thus, where the claimant suffers from 
a preexisting condition which contributes to 
the injury, an unusual or extraordinary ex-
ertion is required to prove legal causation. 
Where there is no preexisting condition, a 
usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient.8 
[9] We also accept Larson's suggestion 
that the comparison between the usual and 
unusual exertion be defined according to an 
objective standard. "Note that the com-
parison is not with this employee's usual 
exertion in his employment but with the 
exertions of normal nonemployment life of 
this or any other person." Larson, supra, 
§ 38.83(b), at 7-279 (emphasis in original). 
See also Johns-Manville Products v. In-
dustrial Commission, 78 I11.2d 171,178, 35 
Ill.Dec. 540, 544, 399 N.E.2d 606, 610 (1979) 
(compensation denied where the risk of the 
employment activity "is no greater than 
that to which he would have been exposed 
had he not been so employed"); Strickland 
8. Larson highlights the difference between the 
unusual-usual exertion test with the rule we 
today adopt with the following examples of ex-
treme cases in the heart attack area: 
Suppose X's job involves frequent lifting of 
200-pound bags, and one such 200-pound lift 
medically produces a heart attack. Under the 
old unusual-exertion rule there would be no 
compensation, regardless of previous heart 
condition. Under the suggested rule there 
would be compensation, even in the presence 
of a history of heart disease, because people 
generally do not lift 200-pound weights as a 
part of nonemployment life, and therefore 
this episode cannot be ascribed to the ordi-
nary wear and tear of life. 
Suppose Y's job involves no lifting. Sup-
pose he lifts a 20-pound weight on the job, 
and suppose there is medical testimony that 
this lift caused his heart attack. Under the 
old test, exclusively concerned with the com-
v. National Gypsum Co., 348 So.2d 497, 
499 (Ala.Civ.App.1977) (employment risk 
must be " 'a danger or risk materially in 
excess of that to which people not so em-
ployed are exposed....' " Quoting from 
City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App. 
701, 705-06, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (1975)). 
But see Market Foods Distributors, Inc. v. 
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726, 727 (Fla.Dist.Ct. 
App.1980) (subjective test: "the employ-
ment must involve an exertion greater than 
that normally performed by the employee 
during his non-employment life"). Thus, 
the precipitating exertion must be com-
pared with the usual wear and tear and 
exertions of nonemployment life, not the 
nonemployment life of the particular work-
er. 
We believe an objective standard of com-
parison will provide a more consistent and 
predictable standard for the Commission 
and this Court to follow. In evaluating 
typical nonemployment activity, the focus 
is on what typical nonemployment activities 
are generally expected of people in today's 
society, not what this particular claimant is 
accustomed to doing. Typical activities 
and exertions expected of men and women 
in the latter part of the 20th century, for 
example, include taking full garbage cans 
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage 
for travel, changing a flat tire on an auto-
mobile, lifting a small child to chest height, 
and climbing the stairs in buildings. By 
parison between this employee's usual exer-
tions and the precipitating exertion, there 
would be compensation. Under the suggested 
rule the result would depend on whether 
there was a personal causal element in the 
form of a previously weakened heartc If 
there was not, compensation would be award-
ed, since the employment contributed some-
thing and the employee's personal life nothing 
to the cause of the collapse. If there was [a 
previously weakened heart], compensation 
would be denied in spite of the medical causal 
contribution, because legally the personal 
causal contribution was substantial, while the 
employment added nothing to the usual wear 
and tear of life—which certainly includes lift-
ing objects weighing 20 pounds such as bags 
of golf clubs, minnow pails, and step ladders. 
Larson, supra, § 38.83, at 7-280-81 (footnote 
omitted). 
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using an objective standard, the case law 
will eventually define a standard for typical 
"nonemployment activity" in much the way 
case law has developed the standard of 
care for the reasonable man in tort law. 
[10] 2. Medical Cause—The second 
part of Larson's dual-causation test re-
quires that the claimant prove the disability 
is medically the result of an exertion or 
injury that occurred during a work-related 
activity. The purpose of the medical cause 
test is to ensure that there is a medically 
demonstrable causal link between the 
work-related exertions and the unexpected 
injuries that resulted from those strains. 
The medical causal requirement will pre-
vent an employer from becoming a general 
insurer of his employees and discourage 
fraudulent claims. 
With the issue being one primarily of 
causation, the importance of the . . . 
medical panel becomes manifest. It is 
through the expertise of the medical pan-
el that the Commission should be able to 
make the determination of whether the 
injury sustained by a claimant is causally 
connected or contributed to by the claim-
ant's employment. 
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697 (Wilkins, J., con-
curring). Under the medical cause test, the 
claimant must show by evidence, opinion, 
or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exer-
tion required by his or her occupation led to 
the resulting injury or disability. In the 
event the claimant cannot show a medical 
causal connection, compensation should be 
denied.9 
III. 
[11] We now undertake to apply the 
foregoing analysis to the case before us. 
In reviewing findings of fact of the Indus-
trial Commission, we determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's findings. Champion Home 
9. Evidence of the ordinariness or usualness of 
the employee's exertions may be relevant to the 
medical conclusion of causal connection. 
Where the injury results from latent symptoms 
with an illness such as heart disease, proof of 
medical causation may be especially difficult. 
Larson's treatise cites many examples of cases 
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Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 
P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1985). 
[12] We have previously stated that the 
key element of whether an injury occurred 
"by accident" is whether the injury was 
unexpected. After reviewing the record, 
we find no substantial evidence that the 
injury was not unexpected. It is clear 
from the uncontradicted testimony of the 
claimant that he experienced an unexpected 
and unanticipated injury to his back as he 
lifted a crate of milk in the cramped area of 
the cooler. Although the claimant had in-
jured his back on prior jobs, he had not 
complained of pain or limitations at his job 
with Kent's Foods. There is no evidence 
which indicates that this injury was predict-
able or that it developed gradually as with 
an occupational disease or progressive back 
disorder. While the employer's report of 
injury and the medical records do not cor-
roborate that a sudden and identifiable in-
jury occurred in the cooler, the reports are 
unhelpful in determining whether the inju-
ry was unexpected. 
It appears that the administrative law 
judge applied the "unusual event or trau-
ma" rule in defining an accident. We have 
rejected that test in lieu of a test based on 
unexpectedness. Moreover, the adminis-
trative law judge's emphasis on prior inju-
ries is not determinative of whether an 
accident occurred. We have previously 
held that the aggravation or "lighting up" 
of a preexisting condition by an internal 
failure is a compensable accident. Powers 
v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 
143, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). We conclude 
therefore that the decision of the Commis-
sion that the claimant's injury was not "by 
accident" was not based on the evidence, 
and that decision is, therefore, erroneous. 
[13] The key issue in this case, like 
most internal failure cases, is whether the 
injury "arose out of or in the course of 
where compensation claims were defeated be-
cause of inadequate proof of medical causation. 
See Larson, supra, § 38.83(i), at 7-319 to -321. 
Compare Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc., 
418 So.2d 626 (La.1982) (heart attack triggered 
by stress, exertion, and strain greater than sed-
entary life of average worker compensable). 
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employ merit." Since the claimant had pre-
vious back problems, to meet the legal cau-
sation requirement he must show that mov-
ing and lifting several piles of dairy prod-
ucts weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the 
confined area of the cooler exceeded the 
exertion that the average person typically 
undertakes in nonemployment life. The ev-
idence presented by the claimant was insuf-
ficient for us to make a determination re-
garding legal causation. It is unclear from 
the record how many crates were moved by 
the claimant, the distance the crates were 
moved, the precise weight of the crates, 
and the size of the area in which the lifting 
and moving took place. Because the claim-
ant did not have the benefit of the fore-
going opinion, we remand for further fact-
finding on this issue. 
Moreover, the record is insufficient to 
show medical causation. It is unclear from 
the medical reports whether the doctors 
were aware of the specific incident in the 
cooler. Further, the case was not sub-
mitted to a medical panel for its evaluation. 
Without sufficient evidence of medical cau-
sation, we are unable to determine whether 
there is a medically demonstrable causal 
link between the lift in the cooler and the 
injury to the claimant's back. We there-
fore remand to the Industrial Commission 
for additional evidence and findings on the 
question of medical causation. 
The decision of the Commission is vacat-
ed and remanded. 
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring and 
dissenting). 
I concur in remanding this case to the 
Commission for the purpose of determining 
lc Powers v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 140, 
143„44f 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). 
2. 115 Utah 1,201 P.2d 961 (1949). 
3. Emery Mining Corp. v. DeFriez, 694 P.2d 606 
(Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial Comm'n, 692 
P.2d 743 (Utah 1984); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 
689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984); Billings Computer 
Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983); 
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 
1982); Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1981); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Ma-
whether the work incident aggravated a 
preexisting condition such as would war-
rant an award of compensation.1 However, 
I do not join the Court in adopting an 
"unexpected result" standard to be applied 
in determining the existence of a compensa-
ble accident. 
I do not believe that this Court has "mis-
construed the historical and logical" defini-
tion of "by accident" in the bulk of its 
recent cases concerning the issue at bar. 
The majority's reliance upon Purity Bis-
cuit Co. v. Industrial Commission2 is 
misplaced. The holding therein is without 
precedential value because it has been sim-
ply ignored.3 The only case in which this 
Court followed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt 
v. Industrial Commission,4 which support 
is similarly without precedential value be-
cause it has also been ignored beginning 
with Painter Motor Co, v. Ostler? the very 
next accident case handed down. In that 
case, the Court cited and relied upon Car-
ling v. Industrial Commission6 and again 
defined "accident" as an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from what 
would normally be expected to occur in the 
usual course of events. In my view, Puri-
ty Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberra-
tions in our post-war case law. 
The majority opinion holds that hence-
forth an injury by accident "is an unex-
pected or unintended occurrence that may 
be either the cause or the result of an 
injury," (Emphasis in original.) However, 
the legislature, whose prerogative it is to 
establish policy, has chosen wording which 
precludes such an interpretation. The rea-
soning of Justice Latimer's dissent in Puri-
son, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980); Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm 'n, 
590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979); Redman Warehousing 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 
P.2d 283 (1969); Carling v. Industrial Comm'n, 
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
4. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980). 
5. 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980). 
6. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
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ty Biscuit illustrates the shortcomings of 
the majority's interpretation. The word 
"accident," when viewed in isolation, may 
be used to denote both an unexpected oc-
currence which produces injury as well as 
an unexpected injury. The word "injury," 
on the other hand, denotes a result and not 
a cause. Had the legislature only used the 
word "injury" in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A., 
1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., 
Supp.1986)), then that statute would cover 
all results regardless of the cause. Had 
the legislature only used the word "acci-
dent," then I would agree with the majori-
ty's holding today that the legislature in-
tended to cover both the cause and the 
result. In fact, however, the legislature 
has used both words "injury" and "acci-
dent." It follows that the word "accident" 
must be interpreted as focusing upon the 
cause and not the result. In short, the 
majority's interpretation writes the word 
"injury" out of the statute. Such a deci-
sion is unwarranted in my view. 
The legislature recently amended section 
35-1-45,7 but chose to leave intact the stan-
dard which limits the payment of compen-
sation to those injured "by accident arising 
out of or in the course of . . . employ-
ment" 8 Moreover, the singular "injury by 
accident" standard has not been altered or 
amended since its inception in 1917.9 The 
legislature thus being satisfied with the 
Court's interpretation of the term "acci-
dent" in the long line of cases beginning 
with Carling v. Industrial Commission,10 
I decline to embark upon a new effort to 
redefine that term. 
STEWART, Justice: (dissenting). 
I dissent. The majority defines the stat-
utory term "accident" to mean "unex-
pected result," regardless of whether it is 
produced by a usual or an unusual event. 
The majority also defines the term "arising 
out of or in the course of employment" to 
7. Act of Jan. 27, 1984, ch. 75, § 1, 1984 Utah 
Laws 610, 610. 
8. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl.Vol. 4B, 1974 
ed., Supp.1986). 
STRIAL COM'N Utah 29 
15 (Utah 1986) 
impose legal and medical causation require-
ments. See U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. 
Curiously, the requirement of "legal cau-
sation" has two different meanings, de-
pending upon the physical condition of the 
worker at the time he is injured. A worker 
having no preexisting medical condition or 
handicap need only prove that the accident 
was caused by a "usual or ordinary exer-
tion." But for congenitally handicapped 
persons and for persons who have suffered 
preexisting industrial injuries (which pre-
sumably have left the worker with some 
physical weakness or deterioration), legal 
causation has a different meaning. Such a 
worker may receive compensation only if 
the "employment contribution" to the inter-
nal breakdown is "greater than that of 
nonemployment life." According to the 
majority, such a worker must now prove 
that his internal breakdown was caused by 
"an unusual or extraordinary exertion" 
in order to establish the requisite legal 
causation, even though the majority opin-
ion itself criticizes at length the "usual-un-
usual distinction as a means of proving 
causation." How the majority can reject 
that standard for persons having no preex-
isting condition, yet embrace that standard 
for persons with preexisting conditions, is 
baffling. 
Furthermore, the difference between the 
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" which 
a worker with a preexisting condition must 
demonstrate and the "usual exertion" 
which a person with no preexisting condi-
tion must demonstrate is far from clear. 
The latter standard is to be judged with 
respect to the " 'normal nonemployment 
life of this or any other person.'" The 
Court emphasizes that the "precipitating 
exertion must be compared with the usual 
wear and tear and exertions of nonem-
ployment life, not the nonemployment life 
of the particular worker." What the term 
"usual wear and tear and exertions of non-
employment" means is not defined by the 
9. Act of March 18, 1917, ch. 100, § 52a, 1917 
Utah Laws 306, 322-23. 
10. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
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majority. The few examples set out do 
little to explain the concept aimed at, other 
than to suggest that the term means some-
thing more than simple, life-sustaining ac-
tivities. 
I wholly fail to understand why persons 
who have a preexisting condition should be 
placed in the disadvantaged position, in-
deed the near-remediless position, that the 
majority opinion imposes upon them. The 
purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to 
provide compensation for workers who 
have preexisting medical conditions and 
therefore run a greater risk of injury when 
they expose themselves to the hazards of 
the work place. But the law should en-
courage such persons to work rather than 
encouraging them to abandon the work 
force for some kind of unearned support. 
This Court has repeatedly stated that the 
Second Injury Fund was designed to en-
courage employers to hire persons with 
preexisting conditions by spreading the 
risk throughout the industry to assure such 
persons that their injuries will be cared for 
without imposing extraordinary liabilities 
on the employers who hire them. Inter-
mountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 
610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. 
United States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504, 
505 (Utah 1976). Society certainly ought to 
favor those policies which encourage peo-
ple to work, rather than policies that deter 
employers from offering gainful employ-
ment to those who have a higher risk of 
work-related injury. There is little person-
al or social benefit from a policy that tends 
to discourage persons from working be-
cause of prior injuries or disabilities. 
Further, it is fundamentally unfair and 
flatly inconsistent with the basic purposes 
of the workmen's compensation laws to 
impose higher standards for compensation 
on those with preexisting medical condi-
tions than on those without. Tort law gen-
erally does not do so. A defendant in a 
negligence action is required to take the 
victim as the defendant finds him; whatev-
er unusual vulnerabilities the victim may 
have are disregarded. That principle 
should not be, and until now has not been, 
different in workmen's compensation law, 
which is really a substitute for tort law 
remedies. In short, handicapped or previ-
ously injured persons who are injured by 
an industrial accident are simply discrimi-
nated against by having to meet the majori-
ty's rigorous legal cause requirement. 
I am also unable to understand how an 
administrative law judge, the Industrial 
Commission, or an appellate court is sup-
posed to determine what "typical nonem-
ployment activities,, are "in today's socie-
ty," as they now must do for the purpose 
of determining legal causation for workers 
with preexisting medical conditions. Does 
that mean what a typical sixty-five-year-old 
does or a typical twenty-one-year-old does 
during his or her nonemployment activi-
ties? Is it what a professional football 
player does in his leisure time or what a 
ballet dancer does? Is it what a sedentary 
worker does in his or her off-hours or what 
a forest ranger does? 
Instead of defining a meaningful stan-
dard, the majority provides examples which 
supposedly illustrate the unarticulated 
principle. The examples "include taking 
full garbage cans to the street, lifting and 
carrying baggage for travel, changing a 
flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small 
child to chest height, and climbing the 
stairs in buildings." These few examples, 
which I find to be arguable in any event 
since they reflect only what some people 
may do from time to time, do not substitute 
for a legal standard. I seriously wonder 
whether changing a flat tire on an automo-
bile is a typical activity in today's society, 
and I do not know how much luggage the 
"typical" individual lifts or how far he or 
she carries it. The point is that the majori-
ty has not set forth a workable standard at 
all In fact, I have serious doubt that such 
an artificial construct as "typical nonem-
ployment activities" will produce more fair 
and rational decisions than our past cases. 
The majority simply assumes a "typical" 
individual for the purpose of establishing a 
rational standard. Unfortunately, disabili-
ties happen to real people, not to "average" 
people, and the law has always recognized 
HOLLOWAY v. INDUST 
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as much. In short, I do not think that the 
majority's newly established standard will 
produce decisions one whit more consistent 
or rational than those produced in the 
past1 
The majority also holds that an injured 
person must prove that the disability is 
"medically the result of an exertion or inju-
ry that occurred during a work-related ac-
tivity." With a degree of hope that I think 
is unwarranted, the majority states that 
"[t]he medical causal requirement will pre-
vent an employer from becoming a general 
insurer of his employees and discourage 
fraudulent claims." I am fearful that that 
hope is seriously misplaced. 
Certainly Professor Larson, largely the 
source of the Court's new standards and 
analysis, is highly acclaimed in this field of 
law, but there is much to be said for the 
case-by-case approach in hammering out 
legal doctrine, even if it does on occasion 
produce inconsistencies. I readily concede 
that present law needs to be rationalized 
and that some cases should be overruled 
because they are hopelessly inconsistent 
with other cases, but I do not believe that 
the law needs to be revolutionized in such a 
manner as to defeat those humane policies 
intended to allow for the injuries of work-
ers who come to the work place in an 
impaired condition. 
I also join the Chief Justice's dissent. 
1. In my view, the decisions of this Court are 
generally reconcilable with only a few glaring 
exceptions and most of them prior to 1980. 
That there are more inconsistencies the further 
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Richard E. HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the 
STATE OF UTAH, Richard E. Hollo-
way Trucking [Employer], and the 
State Insurance Fund [Insurance carri-
er for the Employer], Defendants. 
No. 20621. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 21, 1986. 
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., James R. 
Black, Mary A. Rudolph, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff Richard E. Holloway is a self-
employed truck driver. On July 11, 1984, 
after driving for about six hours, he 
stopped at a rest stop. He claims that he 
slipped while walking across an oil spill on 
his way to the restroom and that the slip 
caused him to jerk to regain his balance. Af-
ter returning from the restroom, Holloway 
bent over to inspect one of his truck tires. 
While crouching, he experienced an imme-
diate sharp pain in his back which made 
him fall to the ground, landing on his arms 
and jaw. His wife, also a truck driver, 
drove for the rest of the trip. Two days 
after the incident Holloway consulted a chi-
ropractor in Georgia. He consulted anoth-
er chiropractor on returning to Salt Lake 
City. The slip on the oil spill was not 
mentioned in the reports of the chiropractors 
who examined Holloway, in the First Re-
port of Injury, or in the claimant's report 
of how the injury occurred. 
The Commission denied review of the 
administrative law judge's order. The 
judge ruled that the plaintiffs injury was 
not the result of an "accident" as that term 
back one goes in our body of law is not particu-
larly unexpected. In any event, I doubt that the 
new approach will produce unwavering consist-
ency over the years. 
ADDENDUM 2: Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Com'n, 
731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1986) 
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Plaintiff merely asserts that defendant 
took his land from Tracy Wright, a witness 
in the Sullivan case. We must therefore 
consider whether a "predecessor in inter-
est" of defendant's had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony 
presented in the abstract. 
The phrase "predecessor in interest" is a 
term of art. Rule 804 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence as originally drafted by the 
Supreme Court allowed former testimony 
to be used if the party against whom the 
testimony was offered or a person "with 
motive and interest" similar to his had an 
opportunity to examine the witness. Wein-
stein, Evidence «804[01] (1985). The 
House of Representative Judiciary Commit-
tee, however, rejected that standard as un-
fair and redrafted the rule to require a 
party's "predecessor in interest" to have 
been present and to have had a similar 
motive to develop the testimony. Id. The 
Senate adopted the version of the rule 
promulgated by the House, as did Utah 
when it adopted the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. While we agree that the "predeces-
sor in interest" requirement is broader 
than the common law privity requirement, 
which required a common property interest 
between the parties, Lloyd v. American 
Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1185-87 
(3d Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 969, 99 
S.Ct. 461, 58 L.Ed.2d 428 (1978), we do not 
find the similarity of parties here close 
enough to permit use of the testimony 
against defendant under the rule. In the 
Sullivan case, the central issue was wheth-
er John Condas trespassed upon Sullivan's 
land. While Condas presented evidence 
concerning all of the road, the case and 
Sullivan's main concern in cross-examina-
tion focused upon the nature of !ne road 
where it abutted Sullivan's land. We find 
the relationship between Sullivan, who in 
1927 tried to prove a trespass by demon-
strating that White Pine Canyon was not 
public where it abutted his land, and de-
fendant in the present action to be too 
attenuated to consider Sullivan a predeces-
sor in interest of defendant. 
Based on the foregoing, we find that it 
was error for the trial judge to have collat-
erally estopped defendant by the outcome 
of the Sullivan and Condas cases and to 
have admitted the abstract of the record 
from the Sullivan case. 
Reversed and remanded for trial. 
HALL, C.J., and HOWE and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents. 
( O f KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
PRICE RIVER COAL CO. and Insur-
ance Co. of North America, 
Employer-Carrier, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and Marie T. Mabbutt, widow of 
Fred C. Mabbutt, deceased, Defendants. 
No. 20473. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 31, 1986. 
Industrial Commission allowed death 
benefits for surviving spouse of employee, 
who died of heart attack while working as 
miner. Employer filed action for review. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held 
that: (1) employee's heart attack was "un-
expected or unintended event" that caused 
his death and, therefore, was "accident" 
within meaning of statute, which allows 
compensation for dependents of employee 
killed by accident arising out of or in the 
course of employment; (2) establishing that 
employee's heart attack arose out of or in 
the course of employment, rather than as 
result of preexisting heart disease, re-
quired finding that employment activities 
involved exertion or stress in excess of 
'normally expected level of nonemployment 
activity for persons in latter half of twenti-
eth century; and (3) remand was required 
32 
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for administrative law judge to make addi-
tional findings of fact as to what employee 
was doing on day of heart attack. 
Remanded. 
Stewart, J., dissented and filed opinion 
joined by Hall, C.J. 
1. Workers' Compensation ^^571 
Employee's heart attack while working 
as belt attendant in underground coal mine 
was "unexpected or unintended event" that 
caused his death and, therefore, was "acci-
dent" within meaning of statute, which al-
lows compensation for dependents of em-
ployee killed by accident arising out of or 
in the course of employment. HC.A.1953, 
35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Workers' Compensation <§=»571 
Establishing that employee's heart at-c 
tack arose out of or in the course of em-
ployment, rather than as result of preexist-
ing heart disease, required finding that em-
ployment activities involved exertion or 
stress in excess of normally expected level 
of nonemployment activity for persons in 
latter half of twentieth century. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45. 
3e Workers' Compensation <s=>1949 
Inadequacy of administrative law 
judge's findings as to what employee's ac-
tivities were on day of death while working 
alone justified remand for more detailed, 
resolution of conflicting testimony, find-
ings and determination whether activities 
amounted to unusual or extraordinary ex-
ertion causing heart attack that arose out 
of or in course of employment. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45. 
4. Workers' Compensation <&»1536 
Evidence that belt attendant job was 
sometimes performed by women did not 
establish that job required less than ex-
traordinary effort or strain and that male 
employee's heart attack was caused by 
preexisting heart disease, rather than 
course of employment. 
5. Workers' Compensation <s=*1949 
Uncertainty as to whether administra-
tive law judge intended to apply correct 
legal standard when it used words, "un-
usual exertion," in concluding that employ-
ee's heart attack arose out of or in course 
of employment justified remand for appli-
cation of proper standard to determine le-
gal cause. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-
1-45. 
6. Workers' Compensation @=»1730 
Medical panel, which served purpose of 
taking facts as found by administrative law 
judge and assisting administrative law 
judge to decide whether medical cause has 
been proven, does not serve role of resolv-
ing conflicts in factual evidence with re-
gard to injured party's activities. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45, 35-1-85. 
7. Workers' Compensation <s=»1730 
Administrative law judge permitting 
medical panel to resolve factual disputes 
improperly abdicates function. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45, 35-1-85. 
James M. Elegante, Erie V. Boorman, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Virginius 
Dabney, Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
On December 20, 1984, the Industrial 
Commission through its administrative law 
judge issued findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and an order allowing death bene-
fits for applicant Marie J. Mabbutt, the 
widow of Fred C. Mabbutt, who died of a 
heart attack while working as a miner for 
plaintiff Price River Coal Co. ("PRC"). 
Mrs. Mabbutt's claim for compensation was 
based upon the Workers' Compensation 
Act, U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (1974 ed.f 
Supp.1986), which allows compensation to 
"the dependents of every such employee 
who is killed, by accident arising out of or 
in the course of his employment." PRC's 
motion for reconsideration or review was 
denied by the Industrial Commission. PRC 
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thereupon filed this action for review. We 
remand for additional findings of fact. 
Fred C. Mabbutt was found dead on Oc-
tober 23, 1981, at the end of his eight-hour 
shift as a belt attendant in PRC's under-
ground coal mine in Helper, Utah. Mab-
butt's job consisted of keeping certain un-
derground conveyor belts working and of 
keeping the belt rollers and the area sur-
rounding these belts free of coal dust and 
other materials which fall from the belts or 
collect around them in the normal course of 
their operation. 
According to both parties, the crux of 
this case is the question of whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the decision 
of the administrative law judge that Fred 
Mabbutt's heart attack and subsequent 
death satisfies the requirement of section 
35-1-45 that the death be "by accident 
arising out of or in the course of his em-
ployment." However, both sides disagree 
about the appropriate legal standard to be 
applied in evaluating the evidence. There-
fore, we have two questions on appeal. 
The first is, What constitutes a compensa-
ble "accident"? The second question is 
whether the evidence of Mr. Mabbutt's ac-
tivities on the day of his death satisfies the 
element of causation such that the acci-
dent, if one did occur, was in fact related to 
his employment. 
There is no need to dwell at length on the 
question of the appropriate legal standard. 
This issue has just been dealt with exten-
sively in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). There we at-
tempted to settle the meaning of the term 
"by accident," which had become confused 
by varying and inconsistent statements 
from this Court over a long period of time. 
The Allen definition is as follows: "Where 
either the cause of the injury or the result 
of an exertion was different from what 
would normally be expected to occur, the 
occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, 
unintended and therefore 'by accident/ " 
Id. at 22 (emphasis in original). This 
definition follows the standard articulated 
in Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), and in 
earlier decisions of this Court that can be 
traced back to 1922, including most notably 
Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). This 
standard has been followed most recently 
in Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 
P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980), and Kaiser Steel 
Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890-91 
(Utah 1981). 
[1] Under the Allen standard, it is fair-
ly easy to determine that Mr. Mabbutt did 
die "by accident" on October 23, 1981. His 
heart attack was certainly an "unexpected 
or unintended" event that resulted in his 
death. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
at 22. However, the finding that the 
death was "by accident" does not complete 
the analysis of whether the resulting injury 
is compensable. Under Allen, the more 
difficult question involves the determina-
tion of whether the injury had the requisite 
connection with the employment duties— 
whether it arose "out of or in the course of 
. . . employment." U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 
(1974 ed., Supp.1986); see Allen v. Indus-
trial Commission, at 22. 
Prior to Allen, the obvious need for a 
test to assure that there was a causal con-
nection between the injury and the employ-
ment duties of the injured party was some-
times dealt with in our cases by requiring 
that the occurrence resulting in the injury 
be shown to have involved "unusual exer-
tion." Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
at 23. This is the standard apparently ap-
plied by the Commission in this case and 
found to have been met. 
However, Allen discarded the 
usual/unusual exertion distinction as a 
means for determining whether the injury 
was the result of an "accident." Instead, 
the Court dealt with the causation require-
ment in more candid terms that focus 
frankly on the questions of legal and medi-
cal causation. It delineated the analysis as 
follows: 
Under the legal test, the law must define 
what kind of exertion satisfies the test of 
"arising out of the employment" . . . 
[then] the doctors must say whether the 
exertion (having been held legally suffi-
34 
1082 Utah 731 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
cient to support compensation) in fact 
caused this [injury]. 
Id. at 25, citing Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation§ 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277 
(1986). 
In applying the Allen analysis to the 
present case, then, the first question is 
whether legal cause has been shown. Un-
der Allen, a usual or ordinary exertion, so 
long as it is an activity connected with the 
employee's duties, will suffice to show le-
gal cause. However, if the claimant suf-
fers from a pre-existing condition, then he 
or she must show that the employment 
activity involved some unusual or extraor-
dinary exertion over and above the "usual 
wear and tear and exertions of nonem-
ployment life0" Allen v. Industrial Com-
mission, at 26, In appraising whether 
the employee's exertion would be usual or 
ordinary in nonemployment life, an objec-
tive standard is to be applied that is based 
on the nonemployment life of the average 
person, not the nonemployment life of a 
particular worker. Id. The requirement 
of "unusual or extraordinary exertion" is 
designed to screen out those injuries that 
result from a personal condition which the 
worker brings to the job, rather than from 
exertions required of the employee in the 
workplace. Id. at 25.* 
In the present case, Mabbutt was suffer-
ing from a preexisting condition which con-
tributed greatly to his heart attack. The 
evidence is uncontroverted that he had hy-
pertensive cardiovascular disease, atheros-
clerotic cardiovascular disease, and possi-
bly diabetic cardiomyopathy. His hyper-
tension was exacerbated by his obesity and 
possibly a high salt diet. He was a diabetic 
and had gout. The doctor on the medical 
1. As a practical matter, when the Allen standard 
is being applied to cases which may involve 
preexisting conditions, before evidence is taken 
on the issue of legal cause, the Commission 
would be well-advised to first make a determi-
nation of whether or not the preexisting condi-
tion does in fact exist. If a preexisting condi-
tion exists, then the parties and the hearing 
officer will know that the "extraordinary exer-
tion" test will be applied to the facts as they are 
developed, and the evidence can be appropriate-
ly prepared and marshalled for presentation to 
panel to which this case was referred by 
the administrative law judge concluded 
that there was no evidence that Mabbutt's 
work "had any relationship to [his] develop-
ment of coronary artery disease." 
[2] Since Mabbutt brought heart dis-
ease to the workplace, before legal causa-
tion can be established, the Commission 
must find that his employment activities 
involved exertion or stress in excess of the 
normally expected level of nonemployment 
activity for men and women in the latter 
half of the twentieth century. If such a 
finding is made, then the requirement of 
legal cause is satisfied because it is-pre: 
sumed that the employment increased the 
risk of injury to which that worker was 
otherwise subject in his nonemployment 
life* At that point, the inquiry shifts to 
medical cause, i.e.t whether the injured par-
ty's work-related activities were, in fact, 
causally linked to the injury. Allen v. In-
dustrial Commission, at 26. 
The question of whether the employment 
activities of a given employee are sufficient 
to satisfy the legal standard of unusual or 
extraordinary effort involves two steps. 
First, the agency must determine as a mat- ~NN 
ter of fact exactly what were the employ-
ment-related activities of the injured em-
ployee. Second, the agency must decide 
whether those activities amounted to un-
usual or extraordinary exertion. This sec-
ond determination is a mixed question of 
law and fact ._^ 
[3] Because the whole legal cause de-
termination hinges upon the agency's find-
ings as to what the injured worker's job-re-
lated activities were, our review of the 
Commission's decision must begin with 
those findings. In the present case, we are 
the fact finder. If a preexisting condition does 
not exist, the hearing may be expedited because 
there will be no need to show how hard the 
employee was or was not working, only that the 
employment activity led to the injury. Of 
course, even if a preexisting condition is in-
volved, if the Commission finds that legal cause 
does exist, then it is still appropriate to refer the 
matter to a medical panel to determine whether 
the facts, as determined at the legal cause hear-
ing, are sufficient to establish medical causa-
tion. 
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unable to affirm the Commission's ruling nothing more than a conclusion, 
because of the inadequacy of these find-
ings. In his job, Mabbutt worked alone in 
the mine, and he encountered only one per-
son while working on the day of his death. 
For that reason, it was necessary to infer 
what Mabbutt's activities were from the 
conflicting evidence adduced at the hearing 
before the administrative law judge. The 
company brought in an expert to describe 
his understanding of the exertion required 
to perform that particular job. His testi-
mony would support a conclusion that no 
unusual or extraordinary effort was re-
quired. On the other hand, Mabbutt's wid-
ow introduced testimony from a fellow 
worker who described how she had seen 
Mabbutt perform the work, testimony that 
might support a conclusion that the effort 
required was unusual. This testimony was 
disputed by the company. 
Unfortunately, the administrative law 
judge's findings do not resolve the conflicts 
in the testimony and do not indicate that he 
made a finding as to exactly what Mab-
butt's activities were on the day of his 
death. Absent such findings, it is impossi-
ble for us to take the next step and deter-
mine whether Mabbutt's work-related ac-
tivities, as found by the Commission, rose 
to the level necessary to satisfy the "un-
usual or extraordinary" exertion threshold 
established by Allen for injured employees 
with preexisting problems. 
The administrative law judge found that 
"Mabbutt died as the result of an accident 
in the course of his employment . . . result-
ing from unusual exertion and stress con-
nected with his employment." It may be 
argued that this is a sufficient finding of 
legal cause to warrant our affirming the 
Commission on this point. However, the 
"finding" of unusual exertion and stress is 
2. We reject, categorically, the suggestion ad-
vanced by the company that because the belt-at-
tendant job is sometimes performed by women, 
it must necessarily involve less than extraordi-
nary effort or strain. We take judicial notice of 
the fact that women, as a group, tend to be 
smaller in size and have less physical strength 
than do men, as a group. However, with re-
spect to size and strength, individual men and 
women are arrayed over a continuum from one 
It is not 
supported by anything that could be con-
strued as a finding as to precisely what 
Mabbutt was doing on the day of his death. 
We cannot affirm such a mixed conclusion 
of fact and law when its necessary premis-
es are not evident. 
[4,5] There is an added problem here. 
The Commission decided this case under 
Tpre-Allen law. We cannot determine 
whether the administrative law judge used 
the words "unusual exertion" in the same 
sense as they have been defined by Allen. 
A talismanic incantation of "unusual or 
extraordinary exertion" is not a substitute 
for careful analysis by the Commission of 
whether the actual job-related activities in 
question exceed the normally expected lev-
el of activity for men and women in the 
latter half of the twentieth century.2 In 
the present case, we are uncertain of the 
standard applied by the Commission and 
cannot tell how the stated conclusion was 
reached. For that reason, we must reverse 
and remand the matter to the Commisnion 
so that proper findings of fact can be en-
tered and the Allen standard can be ap-
plied to them to determine legal cause. 
A word about the issue of medical cause. 
As noted, the administrative law judge did 
not resolve conflicts in the testimony about 
Mabbutt's work activities. However, he 
did adopt the findings of the medical panel, 
which contained a doctor's assumptions 
about what Mabbutt was actually doing on 
the day in question, and which then relied 
on those factual assumptions in finding a 
causal link between the work and his death. 
The factual recitation in the panel report 
was derived from the conflicting evidence 
presented at the hearing and inferences 
drawn from that evidence. In a number of 
extreme to the other. No generalization can be 
made that because a woman performs a certain 
job it necessarily involves strength and exertion 
requirements at the lower end of the spectrum, 
and the contrary is, of course, true of a job 
performed by a man. Each job's demands must 
be evaluated on their own; they cannot be cate-
gorized as requiring "usual" or "unusual" exer-
tion simply because they are normally done by 
women or men, respectively. 
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respects, as the company demonstrated at 
the hearing on its objections to the medical 
panel report and in its brief on appeal, the 
panel was confused as to some of the basic 
duties of Mabbutt's job and made assump-
tions about his actual activities which are 
unsupported by the evidence. 
[6,7] It is not the role of the medical 
panel to resolve conflicts in the factual 
evidence regarding the injured party's ac-
tivities. Section 35-1-85 of the Code places 
that responsibility solely on the Commis-
sion. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-85 (1974 ed.). 
Under Alien, as before, the medical panel 
is only to take the facts as found by the 
administrative law judge and consider them 
in light of its medical expertise to assist the 
administrative law judge in deciding wheth-
er medical cause has been proves The 
medical panel strays beyond its province 
when it attempts to resolve factual dis-
putes, and the administrative law judge 
improperly abdicates his function if he per-
mits the panel to so act. IGA Food Fair v. 
Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). 
We acknowledge that during the adjudi-
cation of this matter, the Commission was 
laboring under the confusing and conflict-
ing state of the law as it had developed 
prior to Allen. The issues presented by 
this and similar cases should be easier to 
resolve in the future. However, questions 
of some subtlety will remain in cases in-
volving claims for internal failure where 
the worker has a preexisting condition that 
contributes to the injury and where a deter-
mination must be made as to whether a 
specific work activity amounts to "unusual 
or extraordinary" exertion. The concept of 
"unusual or extraordinary" exertion re-
mains to be fleshed out over time. Of 
necessity, the process of pouring specific 
content into that concept will rely heavily 
upon the Commission's expertise in and 
familiarity with the work environment. 
This case is remanded to the Industrial 
Commission for findings of fact as to what 
Mabbutt's activities actually were on the 
day of his death. Based upon those find-
ings and upon a review of Allen, the Com-
mission may then adhere to or abandon its 
conclusion that those activities amounted to 
extraordinary exertion. Because the deter-
mination of medical cause must be based 
upon the Commission's findings as to the 
actual activities of the worker, and because 
the panel's report in the present case rest-
ed upon the medical panel's improper as-
sumptions as to the facts, the Commission 
should resubmit the question of medical 
causation to the panel after it has made the 
appropriate factual findings. 
HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice (dis-
senting): 
I dissent. In one of the first important 
tests of the rules laid down in Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986), the majority reverses and remands 
to "resubmit the question of medical causa-
tions to the panel." But the medical panel 
has already addressed that exact question, 
and the administrative law judge found 
that the decedent's death was caused by 
his job-related activities on the day that the 
fatal accident occurred. What more the 
court expects than has been done by the 
Commission is not explained by the majori-
ty. The administrative law judge was cor-
rect in his ruling, the Commission so found, 
and I agree. 
It is precisely this kind of case that dem-
onstrates that our newly formulated meth-
ods of analysis will inevitably draw the 
Commission off into pathways that are 
bound, I believe, to lead to error. The 
Court's unfortunate requirement that, 
since Mabbutt had a preexisting condition, 
the Commission must find "that his em-
ployment activities involved exertion or 
stress in excess of the normally expected 
level of activity for men and women in the 
latter of the twentieth century," is precise-
ly the discriminatory application of work-
ers' compensation laws to workers with a 
preexisting condition, which I referred to in 
my dissent in Allen. 
I would affirm on the authority of Pitts-
burgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 
P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983), and Kaiser Steel 
Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 
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1981). Like Pittsburgh Testing and 
Monfrediy the decedent's preexisting coro-
nary condition was clearly aggravated in 
this case. The administrative law judge 
made that clear in his findings: 
[T]here is no y^ay of knowing exactly 
how long before the hour of 4:20 p.m. the 
applicant first felt the effects of that 
stress or at what time he actually died 
but it could have been some hours before 
4:20 p.m. We are not called upon to 
speculate as to those times or as to the 
excessive stress or exertion later in the 
afternoon in view of the fact that two 
fine cardiologists have agreed that the 
evidence is sufficient to convince them 
that the death was industrially related. 
The Administrative Law Judge finds 
that Mr. Mabbutt died as the result of an 
accident in the course of his employment 
on October 23, 1981 resulting from un-
usual exertion and stress connected with 
his employment on that fateful after-
noon. 
I would affirm. The Commission has 
found the necessary facts, and it is not for 
us to ignore them. 
HALL, C.J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of STEWART, Associate C.J. 
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Joseph P. DORSEY, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 20124. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 31, 1986. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy 
DORSEY Utah 1085 
1085 (Utah 1986) 
Hanson, J., of possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute for value. Defendant 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, 
Associate C.J., held that there was probable 
cause for officer's stop and search of defen-
dant's truck. 
Affirmed. 
Zimmerman, J., filed an opinion concur-
ring in the result in which Durham, J., 
joined. 
1. Arrest <3=>63.5(6) 
Probable cause requirement for search 
is subject to narrow exception for stops of 
moving vehicles where police officers have 
articulable suspicion that automobile's oc-
cupants are involved in criminal activity. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
2. Searches and Seizures <s=>40 
Validity of determination of probable 
cause to conduct search is made from ob-
jective standpoint of prudent, reasonable, 
cautious police officer guided by his experi-
ence and training. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
4. 
3. Searches and Seizures <§=>40 
Determination of whether probable 
cause existed to conduct search depends 
upon examination of all information avail-
able to searching officer in light of circum-
stances as they existed at time search was 
made. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures <s=>41 
In making determination of probable 
cause justifying search, police officer is 
entitled to rely on information gained from 
other police officers. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 4. 
5. Arrest <s=*63.5(6) 
Drugs and Narcotics <3=*183 
Although actual observations of police 
officer conducting search were not enough 
to rise to the level of probable cause, infor-
mation that he received from other officers 
involved in undercover narcotics buy was 
sufficient for him to conclude there was 
probable cause for stop and search of de-
fendant's truck. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
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work site first aid station, where the back 
pain was first diagnosed. 
[8] The second step of the causation 
test requires proof of medical cause. We 
are unable to dispose of this question," how-
ever, because the claimant was not allowed 
to present any evidence of medical causa-
tion and the case was not referred to a 
medical panel. We therefore conclude that 
the administrative law judge committed re-
versible error in not allowing the claimant 
to present medical evidence pertinent to the 
issue of medical causation. 
The claimant also argues that the admin-
istrative law judge erred in not referring 
his case to a medical panel. Reference to 
the medical panel is controlled by statute. 
In 1982, the legislature amended U.C.A., 
1953, § 35-1-77 and changed the require-
ment of a mandatory referral to the medi-
cal panel to a permissive referral. Under 
the statute as now written, "the commis-
sion may refer the medical aspects of the 
case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission." (Emphasis added.) Al-
though referral to the medical panel is not 
required by statute, we believe in this case 
that the findings of that panel would aid 
the administrative law judge. See Cham-
pion Home Builders v. Industrial Com-
mission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985) 
(evidence of causal connection between 
work-related event and the injury may be 
uncertain or highly technical whereby fail-
ure to refer the case may be an abuse of 
discretion). 
Our holding on the medical evidence is-
sue is dispositive of this appeal. The judg-
ment is reversed and the case remanded 
for a determination of medical causation 
and a subsequent ruling consistent with 
this opinion. 
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Chief Justice: (dissenting). 
For the reasons stated in my dissent in 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 
15, 28-29 (Utah 1986), I do not join the 
Court in applying an "unexpected result" 
standard to determine whether an accident 
occurred. 
In denying compensation, the Commis-
sion specifically found: 
The testimony offered at the time of the 
Hearing indicates that, although some 
stress occurred in getting to the work 
site, the incident precipitating the inju-
ries was the everyday action of getting 
into a suit of heavy and unwieldy cover-
alls. No accident occurred during the 
periods of exertion immediately prior to 
the precipitating event. 
The facts of this case clearly support the 
foregoing findings of fact and the conclu-
sion to be drawn therefrom that no acci-
dent occurred. 
I would affirm the order of the Commis-
sion. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of HALL, C.J. 
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UTAH TRANSIT 
AUTHORITY, Plaintiff, 
v, 
Steve BOOTH and the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 
Defendants. 
No. 20788. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 19, 1986. 
Bus driver, who suffered swollen disc 
as result of having to drive bus without 
power steering on morning when there was 
"extreme" amount of snow in streets, filed 
claim for workmen's compensation. The 
Transit Authority denied liability. Driver 
appealed. The administrative law judge 
awarded driver 11 days temporary total 
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disability benefits. Transit Authority ap-
pealed. The Industrial Commission af-
firmed. Transit Authority appealed. The 
Supreme Court held that: (1) driver was 
injured "by accident," and (2) legal causa-
tion was established. 
Affirmed. 
1. Workers' Compensation <s=>569 
Bus driver, who suffered swollen disc 
as result of having to drive old bus which 
was not normally driven by driver and 
which did not have power steering, on 
morning when there was "extreme" 
amount of snow on streets, was injured "by 
accident/' for purposes of Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
2. Workers' Compensation <s=»597 
In order for injured employee to recov-
er under Workmen's Compensation Act, le-
gal causation must be established, and test 
of legal causation varies with employee's 
condition; if employee has preexisting inju-
ry that is aggravated by subsequent acci-
dent, higher threshold of legal causation is 
applicable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
3. Workers' Compensation <3=>1532 
Bus driver, who suffered swollen disc 
as result of having to drive old bus, which 
was not normally driven by driver and 
which did not have power steering, on 
morning when there was "extreme" 
amount of snow on streets, and who was 
not shown to have had any preexisting 
back condition, satisfied lower threshold of 
legal causation necessary to recover under 
Workmen's Compensation Act; medical 
causation was also established by the 
record. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
Linda L.W. Roth, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Ralph L. 
Finlayson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for defendants. 
PER CURIAM: 
Utah Transit Authority (UTA) appeals 
from a decision of the Industrial Commis-
sion affirming an order of the administra-
tive law judge which* awards benefits to 
Steve Booth for a work-related injury. We 
affirm. 
Booth has been an employee of UTA for 
more than ten years. On January 8, 1985, 
he was working his regular shift as a bus 
operator, driving a 1976 manually steered 
GMC 48-foot coach. Normally Booth oper-
ated one of the 1983 or 1984 series of 
coaches which were equipped with power 
steering. He drove the older buses infre-
quently, sometimes not more than once a 
monthc That particular morning there was 
an "extreme" amount of snow on the 
streets. Booth was inbound going west on 
6200 South and was negotiating a turn 
north onto Highland Drive when he sud-
denly felt a popping in his back, accompa-
nied by sharp pain. He momentarily lost 
control over the wheel, so that the bus 
went straight, but regained power over the 
bus and continued his route. He immedi-
ately radioed UTA to ask for a relief opera-
tor as he would not be able to finish his 
shift. After discharging his passengers, 
Booth had to be lifted out of his seat and 
was driven by his supervisor to the Salt 
Lake Industrial Clinic. Medical examina-
tion and a CAT Scan revealed a swollen 
disc. The attending physician prescribed 
bed rest and medication. Booth was ab-
sent from work until January 21. He in-
curred medical expenses of $465 and tem-
porary total disability amounting to 
$335.57. 
UTA denied liability on the ground that 
Booth had a prior history of back trouble, 
and the injury was not a compensable "ac-
cident" No evidence of prior disability 
was presented at the hearing, and the ad-
ministrative law judge awarded Booth elev-
en days temporary total disability benefits. 
In its petition for a writ of review, UTA 
contends that the administrative law judge 
improperly based the award on an unantic-
ipated and unintended injury, whereas an 
injury must result from an occurrence 
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which is "unanticipated and unintended" in 
order to be compensable. The issue here is 
whether Booth was injured "by accident 
arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment" as provided by section 35-1-45 of 
Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act. 
[1-3] As the administrative law judge 
noted, the controversy over what consti-
tutes a compensable injury has been raging 
for some time. However, this Court's deci-
sion in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
— P.2d , slip op. 20026, filed Novem-
ber 14, 1986, has settled this issue with 
respect to the test to be applied. Under 
Allen, the present case plainly meets the 
test for an injury occurring "by accident." 
However, an additional question must be 
answered: was there legal causation? Un-
der Allen, the test of legal causation varies 
with the employee's condition. If he or she 
has a preexisting injury that is aggravated 
by the subsequent accident, a higher 
threshold of legal causation is applicable. 
Allen at . Here, the applicant was not 
shown to have had any preexisting back 
condition, although UTA did put the matter 
in issue. Therefore, the lower Allen 
threshold of legal causation applies, one 
that is easily satisfied here. Id. at . 
Medical causation was also established by 
the record. 
The Commission's ruling is affirmed. 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Richard Louis SMITH, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 19103. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 19, 1986. 
Defendant was convicted of theft by 
deception and theft by receiving stolen 
property by the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., J., by 
jury verdict. Defendant appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Stewart, A.C.J., held that: 
(1) it was harmless error to exclude defen-
dant's testimony concerning his emphysema 
and tuberculosis offered as tending to show 
that defendant had strong motivation to 
avoid imprisonment, and (2) it was harm-
less error to exclude defendant's testimony 
that defendant erroneously believed that 
his parole officer had extremely broad pow-
er to revoke his parole offered as tending 
to show that defendant had strong motiva-
tion to avoid imprisonment. 
Affirmed. 
Durham, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion. 
1. Criminal Law <3=»361(1) 
Proof of guilty knowledge, like proof 
of intent, is usually circumstantial, and de-
fendant should be allowed to introduce evi-
dence which is circumstantially inconsistent 
with state of mind required for conviction. 
2. Criminal Law <fc»342 
Evidence of motive is generally rele-
vant circumstantial evidence of state of 
mind, and defendant's lack of motive to 
commit crime charged is also relevant evi-
dence of his innocence which defendant is 
entitled to place before jury; that per-
suasiveness of evidence may be weak or 
inconclusive goes to its weight, not its. ad-
missibility. 
3. Criminal Law <s=>1170(l) 
It was harmless error to exclude de-
fendant's testimony concerning defendant's 
emphysema and tuberculosis offered as 
tending to show defendant had strong moti-
vation to avoid imprisonment and thus 
would not have knowingly or intentionally 
committed theft by deception or theft by 
receiving stolen property; persuasiveness 
of excluded testimony was weak compared 
with existing incriminatory evidence. 
42 
ADDENDUM 4: Miera v. Industrial Com'n, 728 P.2d 1023 
(Utah 1986) 
43 
MIERA v. INDUSTR1 
Cite as 728 P.2d 
vides conclusive evidence that stabilization 
occurred three months after the accident. 
It should be noted that the "three-month" 
finding of the panel did not directly relate 
to the date of stabilization: it concerned 
the apportionment of medical costs be-
tween current injury and preexisting condi-
tions. In any event, the Commission has 
the discretion to accept or reject a panel's 
report even in the absence of objections. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-77 provides: 
If no objections are so filed . . . , the 
report shall be deemed admitted in evi-
dence and the commission may base its 
finding and decision on the report of the 
panel, but shall not be bound by such 
report if there is other substantial con-
flicting evidence in the case which sup-
ports a contrary finding by the commis-
sion. 
The record in the instant case includes 
substantial evidence to support the Com-
mission's finding that Wallace's condition 
stabilized on November 29, 1983. On that 
date, Wallace's personal physician rated 
Wallace's permanent partial impairment af-
ter characterizing his status as "fairly well 
stabilized." 
The Commission's order is affirmed. No 
costs awarded. 
HOWE, J., dissents. 
Michael F. MIERA, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, Utah Construction & Develop-
ment, Inc., State Insurance Fund, and 
Second Injury Fund, Defendants. 
No. 19411. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 25, 1986. . 
The Industrial Commission denied 
worker compensation benefits for industri-
L COM'N OF UTAH Utah 1023 
23 (Utah 1986) 
al injury, and worker sought review. The 
Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that aggra-
vation of preexisting spondylolisthesis of 
lumbosacral spine as result of heavy lifting 
and jumping into hole to tend sump pump 
in course of employment was compensable 
industrial injury, even though onset of pain 
was gradual. 
Remanded. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
Workers' Compensation <s=558 
Aggravation of preexisting spondylo-
listhesis of lumbosacral spine as result of 
heavy lifting and jumping into hole to tend 
sump pump in course of employment was 
compensable industrial injury, even though 
onset of pain was gradual, as jumps were 
considerably greater exertion than that en-
countered in nonemployment life, and work 
activities which allegedly caused injury 
were capable of producing lumbar strain 
aggravating preexisting problem. 
Robert J. Shaughnessy, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Frank V. 
Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Mary A. Rudolph, 
Gilbert Martinez (2nd Injury), Salt Lake 
City, for defendants. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Plaintiff Michael F. Miera seeks review 
of an Industrial Commission order affirm-
ing an administrative law judge's denial to 
Miera of compensation for an industrial 
injury. 
Miera had been employed for two and 
one-half years as a carpenter with Utah 
Construction & Development, Inc., when he 
sustained an industrial injury on June 25, 
1981. On that day he was engaged in 
cleaning six-inch by ten-foot steel forms 
weighing approximately fifty pounds. He 
lifted the forms onto a saw horse, cleaned 
44 
1024 Utah 728 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
them and then loaded them on a trailer. At 
the same time, he was required to tend a 
sump pump in an eight-foot-deep pit. A 
shelf at the four-foot level facilitated his 
descent into the hole so that he could move 
the hose whenever the pump ran dry. Dur-
ing a four-hour period Miera alternated be-
tween cleaning and stacking forms, and 
jumping four feet onto the shelf and then 
into the hole, a total of eight times at 
thirty-minute intervals. Approximately 
one or two hours later while raking con-
crete, he first felt back pain which did not 
become disabling until the next day when 
he had to ask fellow workers to carry his 
part of the load. 
Miera underwent medical treatment for 
three months, was told to discontinue 
heavy lifting, and did not return to work 
for his employer The latter's insurer, 
State Insurance Fund, paid all medical ex-
penses and temporary total compensation. 
The matter was referred to a medical panel 
which found a preexisting spondylolisthesis 
of the lumbosacral spine, possibly aggrava-
ted by the work activities as described by 
Miera. The panel concluded that "whether 
or not this constitutes an industrial injury 
would have to be determined by the court." 
In her findings of fact, the administra-
tive law judge stated that there was no 
question in her mind that the work per-
formed by Miera on June 25, 1981, was 
"clearly related to the onset of his pain. 
And in fact, findings of the medical panel 
bear this out/' However, the administra-
tive law judge felt bound by the decision in 
Farmers Grain Co-op v. Mason, 606 P.2d 
237 (Utah 1980), and regretted that that 
decision seemed to preclude an award of 
benefits because the onset of the pain was 
gradual, not identified with a specific 
event, and was related to normal duties 
associated with the job while pouring con-
crete. The Industrial Commission, in a 
two-to-one decision, affirmed that holding. 
Miera contends that the administrative 
law judge erred in denying him compensa-
tion based on her finding that no accident 
occurred because he noticed a gradual on-
set of pain which he could not relate to a 
specific event. The State Insurance Fund 
relies on that gradual development of pain 
and the lack of a specific event in its de-
mand that this case be decided in conso-
nance with similar cases in which this 
Court took the position that a compensable 
accident had not occurred. Farmers 
Grain Co-op, supra; Redman Warehous-
ing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22 
Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969); Pintar v. 
Industrial Commission, 14 Utah 2d 276, 
382 P.2d 414 (1963). The Fund also argues 
that plaintiffs injury would not be compen-
sable under those cases which hold that the 
occurrence was completely unrelated to the 
work performance. Billings Computer 
Corp. v. Tarango, 674 R2d 104 (Utah 
1983); Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 
642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982); Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial 
Commission and Thurman, 590 P.2d 328 
(Utah 1979). 
Factually, this case resembles Nuzum v. 
Roosendahl Construction & Mining Cor-
poration, 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977), where 
the plaintiffs decedent died from a heart 
attack after manually operating a stuck 
dumper by climbing in and out of a six-foot 
cab to release the load. This Court in that 
case held that the internal failure was a 
direct result of the just-described exertion. 
As in that case, the issue here is whether 
Miera was injured "by accident arising out 
of or in the course of his employment" as 
provided by U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. The 
administrative law judge found that an in-
dustrial injury had occurred, but denied 
compensation because she questioned the 
accidental nature of the injury. 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
Utah, -— P.2d (1986), we redefined 
the unexpected result of a work-related 
activity as a compensable accident if both 
medical and legal causation could be 
shown. Applied to the instant case, the 
legal causation test is satisfied, even 
though Miera's history of spondylolisthesis 
places him in a personal risk situation. His 
jumps into an eight-foot hole from a four-
foot platform at thirty-minute intervals 
constitute a considerably greater exertion 
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NORTON v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N 
Cite as 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986) 
Utah 1025 
than that encountered in non-employment 
life and are therefore legally sufficient. 
The medical causation test is likewise satis-
fied by the medical panel's finding that 
"the work activities as described over a 
three-day period could produce a lumbar 
sprain aggravating the preexisting problem 
he had hade" No more is needed to hold 
that Miera suffered a compensable indus-
trial accident. 
The case is remanded for a medical eval-
uation of Miera's industrial injury in pro-
portion to his previous disability and a com-
mensurate apportionment of benefit pay-
ments between the Second Injury Fund and 
the State Insurance Fund. Costs are 
awarded to Miera. 
HALL, C.J, and DURHAM and ZIM-
MERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
( O § KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
Bruce D. NORTON, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the 
STATE OF UTAH, United States Steel 
Corporation, [Self-insured Employer], 
and the Second Injury Fund of the 
State of Utah, Defendants, 
No. 21017. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 25, 1986. 
In petition for review, worker chal-
lenged decision of Industrial Commission 
denying his claim for permanent total dis-
ability. The Supreme Court held that find-
ing that worker was not permanently total-
ly disabled was not supported by sufficient 
evidence where Industrial Commission 
failed to consider worker's vocational histo-
ry, educational limitations, learning disabili-
ty, and age, in concert with his multiple 
disabling condition and need for total reed-
ucation. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Workers' Compensation <s=»1639 
Finding that worker was not perma-
nently totally disabled was not supported 
by sufficient evidence where Industrial 
Commission failed to consider worker's vo-
cational history, educational limitations, 
learning disability, and age, in concert with 
his multiple disabling conditions and need 
for total reeducation. 
2. Workers' Compensation <$=»847 
Fact that worker continued work for 
six years after accident, standing alone, did 
not foreclose worker's claim that he was 
permanently totally disabled where worker 
spent those six years in considerable pain. 
3. Workers' Compensation <§=>847 
Relevant factors in determining wheth-
er worker who returned to work after acci-
dent is permanently totally disabled include 
probable dependability with which injured 
worker can sell his services in competitive 
labor market, probability of future impair-
ment of future earning capacity as indi-
cated by nature of injury, age of worker, 
and other relevant factors. 
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>1377 
Only where employee returns to work 
after accident under normal conditions will 
presumption of no loss of earning capacity 
stay unassailed. 
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for Indus. Com'n. 
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for 
Second Injury. 
Phil N. Walker, San Francisco, Cal, for 
U.S. Steel. 
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This approach is inadequate and ignores 
the other necessary questions: first, 
whether the crime charged is a single of-
fense that can be committed in more than 
one way or, instead, multiple offenses; sec-
ond, if a single offense is charged, whether 
the alternative methods of commission are 
significantly distinct from one another in 
terms of their legal or factual content; and 
third, whether there is evidence on each of 
the alternatives. I agree that the three 
sections of Utah's second degree murder 
statute, under which the defendant in this 
case was charged, define a single offense 
that may be committed in three separate 
ways. I further agree that the three alter-
natives are not meaningfully distinct from 
one another because they merely address 
different forms of mens rea, any or all of 
which could properly be inferred from the 
evidence and any or all of which are proper 
predicates for guilt of the offense charged. 
Finally, I agree that there was adequate 
evidence to permit conviction based on any 
of the three alternative mental states at 
the time of the killing. Therefore, I concur 
in the majority's result, and only object to 
the overly broad scope of the opinion and 
its failure to refine adequately the stan-
dards for appropriate application of the 
unanimity rule in other cases. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the 
result 
RICHFIELD CARE CENTER and Utah 
State Insurance Fund, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Lydia J. TORGERSON and Utah State 
Industrial Commission, Defendants. 
No. 20412. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 12, 1987. 
Employer and state insurance fund 
sought reversal of award of compensation 
RTER, 2d SERIES 
and medical benefits for aggravation of 
preexisting industrial injury. The Supreme 
Court, Hall, C.J., held that: (1) employee, 
who injured back while lifting 190-pound 
patient with one arm and reaching with 
other arm to straighten shirt, suffered 
work-related and unexpected injury that 
aggravated preexisting industrial injury 
and that resulted from unusual or extraor-
dinary exertion, and (2) Industrial Commis-
sion was required to consider separate acci-
dents serially and to apportion liability. 
Remanded. 
1. Workers' Compensation @=5569 
Employee, who injured back while lift-
ing 190-pound patient with one arm and 
reaching with other arm to straighten 
shirt, suffered work-related and unex-
pected injury that aggravated preexisting 
industrial injury and that resulted from 
unusual or extraordinary exertion and suf-
fered "injury as the result of an accident/' 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Workers' Compensation <s=>845 
Industrial Commission awarding bene-
fits for compensable injury that aggrava-
ted preexisting injury was required to treat 
accidents serially and determine percentage 
of impairment attributable to each accident 
and proportion that preexisting impairment 
bore to total combined impairment and was 
required to apportion liability so that em-
ployer and second injury fund were each 
liable for one half of benefits paid for 
previous accident, so that employer was 
liable for one third of benefits paid for 
subsequent accident, and so that second 
injury fund was liable for two thirds of 
benefits paid for subsequent accident. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45, 35-1-69(1). 
Fred R. Silvester, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs. 
4ft 
RICHFIELD CARE CE 
Cite as 733 P.2d 
Michael R. Labrum, Richfield, for de-
fendants. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of an award of 
compensation and medical benefits for ag-
gravation of a preexisting industrial injury. 
The primary issue presented is whether the 
incident that caused the aggravation consti-
tuted "an injury as the result of an acci-
dent" within the purview of U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 35-1-45 (Repl.Vol. 4B, 1974 ed.) (amend-
ed 1984). We conclude that it did and 
affirm the award. 
Defendant Lydia J. Torgerson's employ-
ment with plaintiff Richfield Care Center 
consisted of dressing patients and prepar-
ing them for their daily routines. Many 
patients were totally helpless and were in 
need of physical assistance in performing 
normal daily activities. 
On July 6, 1980, while assisting a patient 
to a chair, Torgerson lost her balance and 
was thrown against a wall and onto the 
floor. She suffered pain in her lower back, 
immediately reported the incident to her 
employer, and received medical treatment 
from Drs. Allen and Henrie. She also un-
dertook physical therapy for six months 
and wore a back brace continuously there-
after. 
On January 20, 1982, Torgerson was lift-
ing a one hundred ninety-pound patient 
with one arm and reached with the other 
arm to straighten his T-shirt. In doing so, 
she felt a sudden pain in her lower back. 
She immediately reported the incident to 
her employer and sought medical attention 
the same day. She underwent conservative 
treatment for the next several months and 
finally surgery in September 1982 for a 
herniated disk. 
Torgerson filed an application for bene-
fits for the 1982 incident; plaintiff Utah 
State Insurance Fund denied liability and 
moved to join the Second Injury Fund be-
cause of the 1980 injury. Following a hear-
ing, the administrative law judge conclud-
ed: "The 1980 incident was clearly an in-
dustrial accident, but no claim is made by 
the applicant for that incident. The only 
NTER v. TORGERSON Utah 179 
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event for which a claim is being made is for 
the incident that occurred on January 20, 
1982." Thereafter, the administrative law 
judge determined that the 1982 incident, in 
and of itself, did not constitute an "acci-
dent" and by order dated May 4, 1983, 
denied an award of benefits. 
Torgerson sought and obtained leave to 
amend her application for benefits to in-
clude both the 1980 and the 1982 incidents. 
The administrative law judge vacated his 
order of May 4, 1983, and reopened the 
case. He then referred the matter to a 
medical panel for evaluation of the effects 
of the July 1980 incident and the January 
1982 incident. The medical panel found: 
As far as the herniated disk at L4-5 is 
concerned, it is the opinion of the Panel 
that this is related to the industrial acci-
dent. It is our opinion that this began 
with the injury of 1978, was aggravated 
by the injury of 1980, and was further 
aggravated and required surgery follow-
ing the injury of 1982. 
The medical panel also concluded "that 
the injuries of 1980 and 1982 did medically 
aggravate the pre-existing impaired condi-
tion of the Applicant" and fixed the total 
percentage of permanent physical impair-
ment at seven and one-half percent—two 
and one-half percent attributable to condi-
tions prior to the July 1980 injury, two and 
one-half percent attributable to the July 
1980 injury, and two and one-half percent 
attributable to the January 1982 injury. 
The administrative law judge adopted the 
findings of the medical panel as his own 
and awarded benefits for the 1980 injury 
and the 1982 incident as well, inasmuch as 
it was an accident that aggravated a previ-
ous industrial injury incurred in the same 
employment Disability benefits were or-
dered to be shared two-thirds by the em-
ployer and one-third by the Second Injury 
Fund. 
Plaintiffs do not challenge the award of 
benefits for the 1980 industrial injury. 
Their challenge goes only to the award of 
additional benefits for aggravation of the 
preexisting injury caused by the 1982 inci-
dent, their contention being that the 1982 
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incident arose out of the performance of 
ordinary work activities and therefore did 
not constitute a compensable accident. 
They cite and rely upon Sabo's Electronic 
Service v. Sabol in support of their conten-
tion. However, the analysis of what consti-
tutes an "accident" followed in the Sabo 
line of cases has since been abandoned in 
favor of the "unexpected result" standard 
espoused by the Court in Allen v. Industri-
al Commission:2 
We therefore reaffirm those cases which 
hold that an accident is an unexpected or 
unintended occurrence that may be ei-
ther the cause or the result of an injury. 
We thus necessarily abandon the analy-
sis of "by accident" in the Redman line 
of cases which predicates the "accident" 
determination upon the occurrence of an 
unusual event.3 
[1] The facts of the 1982 incident fit 
well within the rule of law as espoused in 
Allen because (1) the claimant's injury was 
work related and unexpected; (2) the legal 
causation test applicable to a claimant suf-
fering from a preexisting condition which 
contributes to the injury, namely, that 
there be an unusual or extraordinary exer-
tion (here, lifting with one arm a one hun-
dred ninety-pound patient), was met; and 
(3) medical causation was amply estab-
lished by the evidence. Application of the 
foregoing principles of law to the facts of 
this case supports our holding that the 
Commission's award was neither arbitrary 
nor capricious. 
Plaintiffs' remaining contention is that 
the Commission erred in treating the 1980 
and 1982 incidents as a single industrial 
accident rather than serially in apportion-
ing liability between the employer and the 
Second Injury Fund. 
[2] Jacobsen Construction v. Hair4 in-
terprets U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-69(1) (Repl. 
1. 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982); see also Farmers 
Grain Coop. v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980); 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979); 
Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969). 
2. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
3. Id. at 22 (emphasis in original). 
Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., Supp.1983) (amended 
1984), which provided that "the liability of 
the employer for such compensation . . . 
shall be for the industrial injury only and 
the remainder shall be paid out of the sec-
ond injury fund . . . " and concluded that 
the employer's proportion of the liability 
for compensation is equal to the percentage 
of the permanent physical impairment at-
tributable to the industrial injury. Thus, 
the Commission must consider separate ac-
cidents serially in order to determine the 
percentage of impairment attributable to 
each accident and the proportion the preex-
isting impairment bears to the total com-, 
bined impairment.5 
In the instant case, following the 1980 
accident, Torgerson had a total impairment 
of five percent, two and one-half percent 
attributable to preexisting conditions and 
two and one-half percent attributable to the 
1980 accident. Following the 1982 incident, 
Torgerson had a seven and one-half percent 
total impairment, five percent attributable 
to preexisting conditions. Thus, the proper 
apportionment of liability should be one-
half to the employer and one-half to the 
Second Injury Fund for the benefits paid 
for the 1980 accident and one-third to the 
employer and two-thirds to the Second Inju-
ry Fund for the benefits paid for the 1982 
accident.6 
The case is remanded for the purpose of 
entering an order apportioning liability con-
sistent with this opinion. No costs award-
ed. 
STEWART, HOWE, DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ„ concur. 
4. 667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983). 
5c See Second Injury Fund v. Perry's Mill & Cabi-
net Shop, 684 P.2d 1269, 1270-71 (Utah 1984). 
6. The relatively low figures involved make cal-
culation pursuant to the method found in Per-
ry's Mill unnecessary. 
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operation,1 that it was not possible to make 
an accounting of the money received by the 
partners during their 25 years of operating 
the partnership, and that in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, Judge Daniels 
would presume that the partners were sat-
isfied with the distribution of partnership 
proceeds during the course of the partner-
ship. We do not believe, however, that 
that ruling can stand. Judge Croft's ruling 
that it was impossible to account for in-
come over the 25 years of the partnership 
was a reference to the Harris-Fidler part-
nership only. Genave clearly had the duty 
to account for all funds withdrawn from 
Harris partnership accounts. 
[8] Judge Croft's order specifically stat-
ed that the estate was to provide William 
with an accounting of the amounts in 
James' account, "including those funds 
transferred by [Genave] before the death 
of James." Harris v. Tanner, 624 P.2d at 
1137. The $12,000 was withdrawn from a 
Harris partnership account by Genave at 
her father's request. The withdrawal oc-
curred during the period of difficulties be-
tween James, Genave, and William which 
gave rise to this litigation. Under Judge 
Croft's order, the estate had the burden to 
provide an accounting of the funds in ac-
count No. 3. The only evidence adduced in 
the trial before Judge Daniels with respect 
to Zion's account No. 3 was that $12,000 
was withdrawn prior to James' death and 
transferred to James' daughter's account. 
The estate admitted that the account was a 
partnership account and that the $30.58 
balance in it at the time of James' death 
was partnership money. Given the estate's 
burden of proof to show that the $12,000 
was not partnership money and its failure 
to do so, and especially in light of the above 
evidence, we hold that William is entitled to 
one-half the $12,000 dollars withdrawn 
from the account. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for a modification of the judg-
ment in accord with this opinion. No costs. 
1. Apparently William was not actively prevent-
ed by his brother and sisters from carrying on 
HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, 
JJ., concur. 
HALL, C.J., does not participate herein. 
Sv\ 
(O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Don J. HONE, Plaintiff, 
v. 
J.F. SHEA COMPANY and the 
Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Defendants. 
No. 19709. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 18, 1986. 
The Industrial Commission denied 
claim for workers' compensation benefits 
for back injury, and worker appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) 
injury incurred while putting on coveralls 
was accident for purposes of Workers' 
Compensation Act; (2) injury was legally 
caused by working conditions; and (3) re-
fusal of administrative law judge to allow 
worker to present medical evidence perti-
nent to issue of medical causation was re-
versible error. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Hall, CJ., dissented and filed opinion 
in which Stewart, J., concurred. 
1. Workers' Compensation <£=>518 
Incident need not involve external bodi-
ly contact to qualify as compensable injury, 
and internal failure may also qualify as 
accident within meaning of Workers' Com-
pensation Act. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
partnership business until 1970. 
52 
HONE v. J.F. SHEA CO. 
Cite as 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986) 
Utah 1009 
2. Workers' Compensation <s=>516 
Key question in determining whether 
incident is injury entitling worker to work-
ers' compensation benefits is whether oc-
currence was unexpected cause of injury or 
unexpected result of exertion. 
3. Workers' Compensation <s»569 
Injury to worker's back incurred while 
putting on coveralls was accident within 
meaning of Workers' Compensation Act 
where worker unexpectedly and without 
forewarning or anticipation injured his 
back while putting on his coveralls, and 
there was no evidence indicating that claim-
ant had experienced repeated pain or injury 
as with occupational disease or other fore-
seeable injury. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>609 
Determination of whether injury is 
compensable accident requires proof of 
causal connection between injury and work-
ing conditions. 
5c Workers' Compensation <$=>618 
In determining whether working condi-
tions were legal cause of injury, Supreme 
Court examines whether worker brings 
preexisting condition to employment in or-
der to distinguish those disabilities that are 
more likely than not produced by risk relat-
ed to employment from one caused by per-
sonal risk that employee with preexisting 
condition brings to workplace. 
6. Workers' Compensation <3=>553, 568 
Where claimant has preexisting condi-
tion, he must prove that extraordinary or 
unusual exertion led to injury in order for 
injury to be compensable accident, but 
where claimant does not suffer preexisting 
condition, usual or ordinary exertion is suf-
ficient. 
7. Workers' Compensation <s=»619 
Worker's injury was legally caused by 
working conditions where worker suffered 
no preexisting injuries, worker was injured 
as he was putting on heavy and unwieldy 
coveralls, and coveralls were required for 
work in which worker was engaged. 
8. Workers' Compensation <©=>1396, 1937 
Refusal of administrative law judge to 
allow worker to present medical evidence 
pertinent to issue of medical causation was 
reversible error where injury was accident 
within meaning of Workers' Compensation 
Act, and injury was legally caused by 
working conditions. UcG.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
Joseph E. Tesch, Heber, Robert B. Den-
ton, Robert W. Brandt, Michael K. Mohr-
man, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Gilbert 
Martinez (2nd Inj), Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The claimant, Don J. Hone, appeals from 
a decision of the Industrial Commission 
(Commission) denying his claim for work-
ers' compensation for a back injury suf-
fered while at work. We reverse and re-
mand for further findings of fact. 
The claimant began working for J.F. 
Shea Company on a project north of Cur-
rant Creek, Utah, on November 1, 1982. 
On November 19, 1982, while putting on a 
pair of coveralls, the claimant heard a snap-
ping sound in his back, saw stars, and felt 
pain. The company nurse advised him to 
see a doctor in Heber City. He was driven 
about fifteen miles to his truck, and he 
then drove another forty-five miles to He-
ber. Prior to this incident the claimant had 
suffered no back problems. 
Doctors diagnosed the claimant's back 
injury as low lumbar sprain with spasms of 
both paravertebral muscle masses, com-
monly known as "back spasms." While in 
the hospital he also suffered from pulmo-
nary embolisms with lung abscess and 
pneumonia. He returned to work in April 
1983, but could not perform his job because 
of breathing problems. He has not suf-
fered any back problems since his hospital 
release in January 1983. 
The claimant filed for workers' compen-
sation benefits pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 35-1-45. An administrative law judge 
denied that claim on the ground that the 
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incident described by the claimant was not 
a compensable accident. The Commission 
then denied the claimant's motion for re-
view and affirmed the decision of the ad-
ministrative law judge. The Commission 
wrote: 
The testimony offered at the time of the 
Hearing indicates that, although some 
stress occurred in getting to the work 
site, the incident precipitating the inju-
ries was the everyday action of getting 
into a suit of heavy and unwieldy cover-
alls. No accident occurred during the 
periods of exertion immediately prior to 
the precipitating event. Testimony by 
the applicant indicated that the snap in 
his back occurred prior to any type of 
slip or fall. The event subsequent to the 
snap are [sic] in question because of con-
flicting testimony. There is no history of 
prior industrial injuries (or non-industrial 
injuries) to the low back which would 
support a theory of cumulative trauma, 
as in the Monfreidi [sic] case. [Kaiser 
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1981)]. 
The claimant argues four issues on ap-
peal: He first asserts that the administra-
tive law judge and the Commission arbi-
trarily and capriciously refused to consider 
evidence of prior stress and tension in find-
ing that no accident occurred within the 
meaning of the Workers' Compensation 
Act. Second, he claims that the adminis-
trative law judge erred in refusing to allow 
the claimant to present medical evidence 
establishing the cause of his injury. Third, 
he argues that the administrative law 
judge and the Commission erred in failing 
to refer the claim to a medical panel to 
determine whether the injury was an acci-
dent. Finally, the claimant argues that the 
administrative law judge's decision is unre-
viewable because he failed to make ade-
quate findings of fact and to demonstrate 
any legal analysis. In order to treat these 
arguments, we must first determine wheth-
er Hone's back injury is a compensable 
injury under section 35-1-45. 
[1] Section 35-1-45 provides for an 
award of benefits to an employee who is 
injured "by [an] accident arising out of or 
in the course of his employment " The 
Act does not define the term "accident." 
Perhaps the most common type of incident 
constituting an accident occurs when an 
employee is struck by or falls against an 
object. An incident need not, however, in-
volve external bodily contact to qualify as a 
compensable accident. An internal failure 
may also qualify as an accident within the 
meaning of the Act. Jones v. California 
Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 616, 244 P.2d 
640, 642 (1952). 
We recently set forth the analysis we 
intend to follow in accident cases involving 
internal failures in Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15, (Utah 1986). 
There, after discussing alternative defini-
tions of the term "by accident," we cited 
with approval the definition of "accident" 
found in Carling v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965): 
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from 
what would normally be expected to oc-
cur in the usual course of events 
[T]his is not necessarily restricted to 
some single incident which happened sud-
denly at one particular time and does not 
preclude the possibility that due to exer-
tion, stress or other repetitive cause, a 
climax might be reached in such manner 
as to properly fall within the definition of 
an accident as just stated above. How-
ever, such an occurrence must be distin-
guished from gradually developing condi-
tions which are classified as occupational 
diseases 
Id. at 261-62, 399 P.2d at 203 (citations 
omitted). 
We then explained that the key ingredi-
ent of an industrial accident is an unex-
pected occurrence. That occurrence may 
be "either the cause or the result of an 
injury." Allen, at 22. We expressly re-
jected the position that the determination 
of an "accident" depends upon the happen-
ing of an unusual event or occurrence such 
as a slip, a fall, or an extraordinary exer-
tion. Id. ^ We said that so long as "the 
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cause of the injury or the result of an 
exertion was different from what would 
normally be expected to occur, the occur-
rence was unplanned, unforeseen, unin-
tended and therefore by accident" Id. at 
22. 
[2,3] In determining whether a com-
pensable accident occurred in this case, the 
Commission applied the legal standard 
from Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi That case 
affirmed an award of workers' compensa-
tion benefits to an employee who suffered 
a back injury resulting from exertion or 
stress from shoveling coal. In Monfredi 
the Court applied the "cumulative trauma" 
theory from Carling whereby an internal 
failure may be an accident if it is a " 'cli-
max* due to exertion, stress, or other repet-
itive cause . . . in such a manner as to 
properly fall within the definition of an 
accident." 631 P.2d at 892 (quoting from 
Carling, 16 Utah at 261-62, 399 P.2d at 
203). In the case at bar, the Commission 
distinguished Monfredi on the basis that 
Mr, Monfredi, unlike Mr. Hone, had a histo-
ry of work-related accidents and a job-in-
duced preexisting condition. That distinc-
tion is unnecessary in light of the definition 
of "by accident" announced in Allen. 
Whether the claimant had a preexisting 
condition is relevant to the issue of causa-
tion, but is not determinative of whether 
the injury occurred "by accident" The key 
question here is whether the occurrence' 
was the unexpected cause of the injury or 
the unexpected result of an exertion. The 
evidence in this case reveals that the claim-
ant unexpectedly and without any fore-
warning or anticipation injured his back 
while putting on his coveralls. None of the 
evidence indicated that the claimant had 
experienced repeated pain or injury as with 
an occupational disease or other foreseea-
ble injury. Under these circumstances, the 
injury in the case at bar was "by accident" 
[4-6] The next step in determining 
whether an injury is a compensable acci-
dent requires analysis of whether the inju-
ry arose out of or in the course of employ-
ment Allen, at 25. This factor requires 
proof of a causal connection between the 
'. SHEA CO. Utah 1011 
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injury and the working conditions. In Al-
len v. Industrial Commission, we adopted 
a two-part causation test proposed by Pro-
fessor Larson. Under that test, we first 
consider the legal cause of the injury and 
then its medical cause. In the*Tegal causa-
tion inquiry, we examine whether the 
claimant brings a preexisting condition to 
the employment in order to distinguish 
those disabilities that are more likely than 
not produced by a risk related to the em-
ployment from one that is caused by a 
personal risk that an employee with a 
preexisting condition brings to the work-
place. Bryant v. Masters Machine Co., 
444 A.2d 329, 337 (Mel982). Under this 
test, when the claimant has a preexisting 
condition, he must prove that an extraordi-
nary or unusual exertion led to the injury. 
When the claimant does not suffer a preex-
isting condition, usual or ordinary exertion 
is sufficient. Allen, at 25. The compari-
son between the usual and unusual exer-
tion is defined according to an objective 
standard. " 'Note that the comparison is 
not with this employee's usual exertion in 
his employment but with the exertions of 
normal nonemployment life of this or any 
other person.'" Id. at 26 (quoting Lar-
son, Workmen's Compensation § 38.83(b) 
at 7-279 (1986)). 
[7] The Commission never considered 
the question of legal causation in this case. 
However, because there is sufficient evi-
dence in the record, we will not remand on 
this issue. The evidence clearly indicates 
that the legal cause test was met in this 
case. The administrative law judge found 
that the claimant had suffered no preexist-
ing injuries. Therefore, he needs to show 
only that the injury occurred during a 
usual or ordinary exertion. The evidence is 
undisputed that the claimant was injured 
as he began to put on "heavy and unwieldy 
coveralls" at work Those coveralls were 
required for the outdoor construction work 
in which the claimant was engaged. Proof 
of legal causation is further substantiated 
by the fact that immediately after the inci-
dent the claimant saw the nurse at the 
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work site first aid station, where the back 
pain was first diagnosed. 
[8] The second step of the causation 
test requires proof of medical cause. We 
are unable to dispose of this question, how-
ever, because the claimant was not allowed 
to present any evidence of medical causa-
tion and the case was not referred to a 
medical panel. We therefore conclude that 
the administrative law judge committed re-
versible error in not allowing the claimant 
to present medical evidence pertinent to the 
issue of medical causation. 
The claimant also argues that the admin-
istrative law judge erred in not referring 
his case to a medical panel. Reference to 
the medical panel is controlled by statute. 
In 1982, the legislature amended U.C.A., 
1953, § 35-1-77 and changed the require-
ment of a mandatory referral to the medi-
cal panel to a permissive referral. Under 
the statute as now written, "the commis-
sion may refer the medical aspects of the 
case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission/' (Emphasis added.) Al-
though referral to the medical panel is not 
required by statute, we believe in this case 
that the findings of that panel would aid 
the administrative law judge. See Cham-
pion Home Builders v. Industrial Com-
mission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985) 
(evidence of causal connection between 
work-related event and the injury may be 
uncertain or highly technical whereby fail-
ure to refer the case may be an abuse of 
discretion). 
Our holding on the medical evidence is-
sue is dispositive of this appeal. The judg-
ment is reversed and the case remanded 
for a determination of medical causation 
and a subsequent ruling consistent with 
this opinion. 
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Chief Justice: (dissenting). 
For the reasons stated in my dissent in 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 
15, 28-29 (Utah 1986), I do not join the 
Court in applying an "unexpected result" 
standard to determine whether an accident 
occurred. 
In denying compensation, the Commis-
sion specifically found: 
The testimony offered at the time of the 
Hearing indicates that, although some 
stress occurred in getting to the work 
site, the incident precipitating the inju-
ries was the everyday action of getting 
into a suit of heavy and unwieldy cover-
alls. No accident occurred during the 
periods of exertion immediately prior to 
the precipitating event. 
The facts of this case clearly support the 
foregoing findings of fact and the conclu-
sion to be drawn therefrom that no acci-
dent occurred. 
I would affirm the order of the Commis-
sion. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of HALL, C.J. 
UTAH TRANSIT 
AUTHORITY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Steve BOOTH and the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 
Defendants. 
No. 20788. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 19, 1986. 
Bus driver, who suffered swollen disc 
as result of having to drive bus without 
power steering on morning when there was 
"extreme" amount of snow in streets, filed 
claim for workmen's compensation. The 
Transit Authority denied liability. Driver 
appealed. The administrative law judge 
awarded driver 11 days temporary total 
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pay Mrs. Jacobsen's costs and attorney-
fees on appeal. 
HALL, C.J., and HOWE and ZIMMER-
MAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents. 
CHAMPION HOME BUILDERS and 
Aetna Casualty and Surety, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP 
UTAH and John S. Skrlac, 
Defendants. 
No. 20332. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 18, 1985. 
In a worker's compensation proceed-
ing, worker was awarded medical expenses 
and temporary total disability for perfor-
ation of his duodenal ulcer, allegedly 
caused by heavy lifting at place of employ-
ment. Employer's motion to the Industrial 
Commission for review was denied. Em-
ployer appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart, J., held that: (1) the causal con-
nection between the heavy lifting and the 
perforation of the ulcer had been estab-
lished by substantial evidence; (2) lifting 
the heavy beam was an "accident" within 
purview of the worker's compensation stat-
ute; and (3) failure to refer the case to a 
medical panel was not an abuse of discre-
tion. 
Affirmed. 
Zimmerman, J., concurred in the re-
sult. 
1. Workers' Compensation <3=»1939.4(4) 
The Supreme Court reviews Industrial 
Commission's findings of fact only to deter-
mine whether the findings are supported 
by substantial evidence. 
2. Workers' Compensation <3=»1506 
Causal connection between worker lift-
ing a heavy beam and perforation of his 
ulcer was established by substantial evi-
dence, including letter from physician stat-
ing that conceivably the perforation would 
not have occurred if worker had not lifted 
beam, and evidence that abdominal pain 
occurred upon lifting. U.C.A. 1953, 35-1-
45. 
3. Workers' Compensation <&»545 
Lifting an unusually heavy beam at 
place of employment, causing worker's ul-
cer to rupture, was an "accident" within 
scope of worker's compensation statute. 
U.C.A. 1953, 35-1-45. 
4. Workers' Compensation <S:»1309 
Failure of administrative law judge to 
refer worker's compensation case to medi-
cal panel was not abuse of discretion, 
where causal connection between work-re-
lated accident and injury was established 
by substantial evidence. 
Christopher A. Tolboe, Salt Lake City, 
for appellant. 
K. Allan Zabel, Salt Lake City, Pete N. 
Vlahos, Ogden, for respondent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
John Skrlac was awarded medical ex-
penses and temporary total disability for 
perforation of his duodenum resulting from 
heavy lifting at work. His employer, 
Champion Home Builders, appeals. We af-
firm. 
Skrlac built rafters and ceilings for 
Champion Home Builders on an assembly 
line. On August 4, 1983, while lifting a 
heavy beam, Skrlac felt a sharp pain in his 
side. A medical examination by a Dr. Hi-
11am following the pain showed that claim-
ant had a perforated duodenal ulcer and 
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Skrlac applied for worker's compensation 
benefits. At the hearing, a letter from Dr. 
Hillam was introduced which stated that 
although Dr. Hillam knew of no medical 
data which cites lifting as a cause of ulcer 
perforation, he was aware that lifting 
causes an increase in stomach pressure, 
and that ulcers perforate more often when 
there is an increase in stomach pressure. 
In a follow-up letter, Dr. Hillam concluded 
that "[i]t is certainly conceivable that had 
[Skrlac] not been lifting, the ulcer may not 
have perforated at all." No other expert 
medical testimony or evidence was adduced 
and the matter was not referred to a medi-
cal panel. 
The administrative law judge found that 
Skrlac's lifting was a cause of the ulcer 
perforation. He analogized this case to 
hernia and heart attack cases in which the 
exertion is not the sole cause of the hernia 
or heart attack, but is a ' 'precipitating 
factor," without which the hernia or heart 
attack may never have occurred. Champi-
on Home Builders filed a motion for re-
view, which the Industrial Commission de-
nied. 
On appeal, Champion Home Builders ar-
gues that the evidence failed to establish a 
causal connection between the lifting and 
the perforation. It relies on Dr. Hillam's 
statement in his letter that he knew of no 
medical data which cites lifting as a cause 
of ulcer perforation. 
[1] In reviewing Industrial Commission 
findings of fact, we determine only wheth-
er the Commission's findings are supported 
by substantial evidence. Kennecott Corp. 
v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 675 P.2d 
1187, 1192 (1983); Kent v. Industrial Com-
mission, 89 Utah 381, 385, 57 P.2d 724, 725 
(1936). 
The governing statute is U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 35-1-45, which provides for compensa-
tion or death benefits if an employee is 
injured or killed "by accident arising out of 
or in the course of his employment." Un-
der that section, the claimant must prove 
that the work-related event was a contribu-
ting cause of the injury. Higgins v. Indus-
trial Commission, Utah, 700 P.2d 704 
(1985); Schmidt v. Industrial Commis-
sion, Utah, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (1980); Mak-
er v. Workers' Compensation Appeals 
Board, 33 Cal3d 729, 190 Cal.Rptr. 904, 
661 P.2d 1058, 1063(1983). 
[2] In this case, Dr. Hillam's evidence 
and the occurrence of abdominal pain at 
the moment of lifting constitute substantial 
evidence sufficient to support the Commis-
sion's finding that there was a causal con-
nection between Skrlac's lifting and the 
ulcer perforation. 
Other jurisdictions have also sustained 
awards for perforated ulcers on evidence 
that the ulcer perforated or ruptured dur-
ing heavy lifting or straining. E.g., True-
love v. Hulette, 103 Ga.App. 641, 120 
S.E.2d 342 (1961); Cutno v. Neeb Kearney 
& Co., 237 La. 828, 112 So.2d 628 (1959); 
Jennings v. Simon Manges & Sons, Inc., 
284 A.D. 1071, 136 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1954). See 
also cases cited at IB A. Larsen, Work-
men's Compensation Law § 38.20 n. 43 
(1982). 
[3] Champion Home Builders argues 
that no "accident" occurred in this case 
within the scope of § 35-1-45 because 
Skrlac's ulcer could have perforated as ea-
sily at home as at work, and cites as its 
sole support Billings Computer Corp. v. 
Tarango, Utah, 674 P.2d 104 (1983). In 
Billings we vacated an award of benefits 
because the claimant failed to establish 
that an "accident" had occurred when she 
kneeled at work and felt a sharp pain in 
her knee. We reasoned: "The fact that 
[claimant's] injury occurred while at work 
was mere coincidence [T]he circum-
stances which precipitated her injury were 
in no way unusual . . . . " Id. at 106-107. 
However, in this case the circumstances 
were clearly unusual: Skrlac was lifting a 
very heavy double beam which ordinarily 
required two people to lift. That the ulcer 
perforated while claimant was lifting the 
beam was not a mere coincidence. 
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[4] Finally, Champion Home Builders 
argues that the administrative law judge 
abused his discretion by not referring this 
case to a medical panel. Utah Code Ann., 
1953, § 35-1-77 (Supp,1983), provides that 
where the employer or insurance carrier 
denies liability, "the commission may refer 
the medical aspects of the case to a medical 
panel appointed by the commission . . . . " 
(Emphasis added.) In some cases, such as 
where the evidence of causal connection 
between the work-related event and the 
injury is uncertain or highly technical, fail-
ure to refer the case to a medical panel 
may be an abuse of discretion. However, 
on the facts of this case, we think there 
was no abuse of discretion. 
Affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., and HOWE and DURHAM, 
JJ., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the result. 
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